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1Institutions and the Emergence of Markets —
Transition in the Murmansk Forest Sector
Lyudmila Ivanova and Vigdis Nygaard
1. Introduction
IIASA has devoted several studies to the sustainability of Russian forests in the period
of transition. The aim of this study is to describe and analyze the current institutional
framework of the Russian forest sector. For this purpose, several Russian regions have
been chosen for study. The Institute has already published reports on the regions of
Tomsk, Arkhangelsk, Moscow, Khabarovsk and Karelia. The reports on Irkutsk and
Krasnoyarsk are currently being prepared for publication.1 This report deals with
Murmansk Oblast.2 The region differs from other Russian regions involved in the study,
where the forest industry is large and of significant economic importance. In contrast,
the forest industry in Murmansk Oblast has never played a significant role for the
economy at large. Forest resources in the region are not abundant. Severe climatic
conditions cause low productivity of the forests. Under these conditions the problem of
sustainable management seems to be of special relevance for the region’s forests.
The forest industry in the region has never been profitable. Currently it experiences a
deep economic crisis. Disintegration of old production links and the end of subsidies
from the center have led to a dramatic production fall. Many forest companies have
gone bankrupt, as they have not managed to adapt to the new economic conditions.
Those still operating are mostly oriented to a survival strategy. Wood processing
companies suffer from the lack of money to buy raw materials, while harvesting
companies have problems selling their products. Remoteness and high transport tariffs
restrain expansion of the market for their production.
Even though the existing companies possess facilities for harvesting and processing of
timber, most of them lack modern machinery. There is a need for a restructuring of the
production facilities to meet market demands for quality products. Our research seeks to
establish whether the industry is needed for the regional wood demand and, if so, how it
can be developed.
                                               
1
 See, Carlsson and Olsson (1998); Carlsson et al. (1999a); Carlsson et al. (1999b); Efremov et al. (1999);
Kleinhof et al. (1999); Piipponen (1999); Blam et al. (2000, forthcoming); and Sokolova (2000, forth-
coming).
2
 A companion piece dealing with the practice of timber auctions in Murmansk Oblast has also recently
been published by IIASA (see, Jacobsen, 1999).
2However, the future development of the forest sector is to a large extent dependent upon
the institutional structure provided to help the sector enter the market economy. A
largely new institutional structure is needed for the successful functioning of the
industry in its new context.
That institutions affect economic performance is hardly controversial. That the
differential performance of economies over time is fundamentally influenced by the
way institutions evolve is also not controversial (North, 1997:1).
This is confirmed by the situation in the Murmansk forest industry. The old institutional
structure has disintegrated, its rules are no longer valid, but a new one has not yet been
established.
We have conducted a survey among companies in the Murmansk forest sector and this
report presents the results of our findings. Our study reveals and discusses the rules
guiding enterprises’ behavior in the sector. Based on an analysis of the current situation
we evaluate the prospects of the forest industry in the region.
The Structure of the Report
The report includes seven chapters describing the idea of the work, the resource base,
the socioeconomic situation in the region, the structure of forest management, transition
and business behavior in the forest industry. The report ends with conclusions and
recommendations. In the introductory chapter, we describe why it is important to study
the institutional structure of the forest sector. The methodology and data collection is
also outlined in this chapter.
The second chapter “The Resource Base — Forests in Murmansk Oblast”, depicts the
physical attributes of the regional forests. It provides an explanation of such basic terms
as classification of forests in Russia, annual allowable cuts, and it provides basic
information about the applied method of harvesting, ecological problems, and the
infrastructure.
The third chapter, “Socioeconomic Characteristics of Murmansk Oblast”, gives an
overview of the demographic situation in the region, the educational level of the
population compared to some other regions of the Russian Federation, as well as
changes in the workforce. The structure of the region’s economy, its industrial
development and salaries are also discussed.
In the fourth chapter, “Management in Murmansk Forestry — Rules in Use”, we focus
on institutional aspects. We begin with a brief overview of the development of forest
management. Then we discuss the roles of various actors involved in forest
management and how they are coping with the new situation.
The fifth chapter, “The Forest and Wood Processing Industry in Transition”, is devoted
to the transition process in the region’s forest industry. After some general description
of the privatization process in Russia, we discuss the basis of the interviews conducted
with forest companies and how changing property forms have affected their business
performance. Changing terms of timber acquisition is another topic of the chapter.
3Finally, we describe the current situation in the forest and wood-processing industry and
how this has affected production volumes.
The sixth chapter, “Business Behavior”, is based on the results of the survey among
forest enterprises in Murmansk Oblast. Here the situation is depicted at the company
level. Features and problems connected to the enterprise’s activity and the obstacles
hindering transactions are analyzed and compared to some other regions involved in the
study.
In the final chapter, “Evaluation Criteria and Conclusions”, we try to summarize our
findings in Murmansk Oblast. The institutional structure connected to the forest sector
is evaluated using a number of criteria. More details are given in the methodology part
of this chapter. We discuss the sector’s future from both the demand side and its
capability to adapt to the new conditions.
Methodology
In order to study the changes of institutions in the Russian forest sector we need a
methodology making it possible to cover all the aspects concerning the institutional
structure. It is well known that adopted laws and regulations are not the only rules
guiding the relations between actors.
Formal rules include political (and judicial) rules, economic rules and contracts.
[...] Informal constraints cannot be as precisely defined as formal rules. They are
extensions, elaborations and qualifications of rules that “solve” innumerable
exchange problems not completely covered by formal rules and that in
consequence have tenacious survival activity (North, 1997:3).
We used the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD) to structure the
study of the forest sector in the Murmansk Oblast. This framework has also been used in
the project’s other case studies of Russian regions and has been widely used for
institutional analysis. The advantage of using the framework is that it does not limit
analysis to the use of one theory (Ostrom et al., 1994). Transaction cost and property
rights theories are used within the framework.
As the framework has already been developed in detail (Ostrom et al., 1994) we will
only describe how it is used in our report. The forest sector of Murmansk Oblast is
considered as an action arena, which is the central focus of the study. The action arena
includes two elements, namely action situations and actors.
A minimal action situation is characterized using seven clusters of variables: (1)
participants, (2) positions, (3) actions, (4) potential outcomes, (5) a function that
maps actions into realized outcomes, (6) information, and (7) the costs and
benefits assigned to actions and outcomes. Actors are participants in action
situation who have preferences, information-processing capabilities, selection
criteria and resources outcomes (Ostrom et al., 1994:29).
According to the IAD framework there are three sets of factors connected to the action
arena: attributes of the physical world, attributes of community, and rules-in-use.
In our case study, the physical world attributes include such characteristics as the
composition and quantity of forests in Murmansk Oblast. Indicators of the
4socioeconomic situation in the region constitute the block of attributes of the
community. Rules-in-use represent all kinds of norms and regulations being the basis of
interactions within the action arena — the Murmansk forest sector in our case. All the
three sets of variables affect the action arena producing different patterns of
interactions. In turn they produce some results which can be evaluated using various
criteria.
Attributes of
Physical World
Attributes of
Community
Rules-in-Use
Action Arena
Action
Situations
Actors
Patterns of
Interactions
Outcomes
Evaluative
Criteria
Figure 1:1. A framework for institutional analysis (Source: Ostrom et al., 1994:37).
As has been done in earlier IIASA reports describing other regions selected for case
studies, we have adopted the following conditions as indicators of sustainable forest
management. Using the same evaluative criteria enables us to make some comparisons
with other regions in the study (cf. Carlsson and Olsson, 1998).
• Constitutional rules are acknowledged and transparent.
• The structure of property rights is settled and well defined, i.e., private actors can
acquire property or acquire the right to utilize property for their own benefit.
• Rules and regulations from official authorities are regarded as legitimate and apply
equally to similar actors.
• The market decides the prices of property and goods.
• Decision-making regarding collective choice and operational rules is decentralized.
• Private investors can realize the returns on their investments.
• Rules are enacted aimed at preventing the devastation of natural resources.
• Legitimate authorities take measures against violations of rules.
5Throughout the report we verify to what extent the mentioned indicators of sustainable
forest management are met by the real situation in the Murmansk forest sector.
Data Collection
 To accumulate the necessary information we use various relevant sources. The data is
collected so that it will be possible to trace the whole chain from the growing forest to
the market. The timber is harvested and used as raw material supply in the processing
and manufacturing of forest products.
 
 
RAW MATERIAL SUPPLY HARVESTING PROCESSING AND MANUFACTURING
 
 Figure 1:2.  The chain of production in our action arena, Murmansk Oblast. (Source:
Carlsson et al., 1999a:6.)
Our sources used in the report can be classified according to the type of data.
• Statistical data about the regional socioeconomic conditions and industry are mainly
collected from the regional office of Goskomstat: The Murmansk Oblast Committee
on State Statistics. The Murmansk Forest Management produces statistical
information about forestry and we also use some official statistics from the
Murmansk Oblast Committee on Nature Protection. To some extent we use statistical
data from all Russian regions that are drawn together in the IIASA Russian Forest
Study database. This is particularly the case when we compare statistical information
from Murmansk with other regions.
• Newspaper articles are used to monitor the regional and local discussion on forestry
and forest industry issues. They enable us to follow the development through the
public’s contribution to the debate and from the point of view of “outside”
journalists.
• Laws and decrees related to the forest sector are used to understand the formal rules
in use. They can be federal laws adopted by the Duma, the President or other State
organs, or they can be regional laws adopted by the regional Duma and the
Governor.
• Programs and regional analyses are made to plan the future development of the
sector. The Murmansk Forest Management and Murmansk Regional (Oblast)
Administration are the main contributors of such planning documents.
• Structured interviews have been conducted with 24 forest companies in the
Murmansk Oblast. The questionnaire was designed by IIASA and has been used in
all the analyzed regions in the Institutional Framework Study. The total number of
companies interviewed in different regions of Russia and Sweden is 245. The
questionnaire consists of 4 parts: general description of the enterprise, input side of
the enterprise, output side of the enterprise and institutional aspects.
6• Additional interviews have been made to obtain supplementary information about the
enterprises and the management of forestry. Interviews were made with
representatives of Murmansk Forest Management and the Regional Administration.
Using interviews with individual companies is quite a new method of data collection in
Russia. The Soviet centralized planning system gave all the statistics necessary to plan
for the future, even though the figures did not always correspond with actual production
numbers. They were used more as indicators of expected performances from the
companies. The method of collecting statistical information in Russia is still
troublesome and the figures must be handled with some caution. Using the method of
interviews seems useful under the current circumstances in Russia, as it is a method
aimed at revealing what is really happening at the company level. This is not only
related to production numbers and economic performance, but also to how companies
interact on the action arena and how the enterprises are linked to the institutional
framework. In accordance with the IAD framework, we begin the report with a
description of the physical attributes of the Murmansk Oblast and its forests.
2. The Resource Base — Forests in Murmansk Oblast
Murmansk Oblast was established on May 28, 1938. It is situated on the Kola Peninsula
in Northwest Russia. Almost all of the region’s territory is located above the Arctic
Circle and covers two geographical zones: tundra and taiga. In the north the region is
washed by the Barents Sea and in the south by the White Sea. The region’s territory
constitutes 144,900 km2 (0.85% of Russia’s entire territory).
The Kola Peninsula has always been sparsely populated. In the 14th century, the first
settlers founded monasteries in what is now known as the town of Pechenga and Kola.
Farmers came from the south and some forestry activities were going on along the rivers
and around the town of Kola. The indigenous Saami population lived all over the North
Calotte with their reindeer pastures and nomadic lifestyle. The first significant
immigration started after the Russian revolution in 1917 when the city of Murmansk
was founded and the Northern railway was prolonged. The industrialization based on
the region's raw materials began and demanded huge amounts of workers. The region
was part of Arkhangelsk Gubernia before it became a Soviet province in 1938.
At present, the large industrial complex in the region is based on the favorable
geographical location (relative closeness to the industrially developed regions of
Russia), the possibility of all-year-round navigation with direct outlets to international
commercial routes and the region's unique mineral resources.
Although Murmansk Oblast has never been as rich in forest resources as some other
Russian regions, logging was one of the first business activities started on the territory.
Development of a forest industry in the region began in 1898 when the first sawmill was
constructed in the settlement of Umba. By the beginning of the 20th century there were 6
sawmills in the region. However, due to climatic conditions the boreal forests in the
region have low productivity. The share of the forest industry in the region’s economy
has never been high and has dramatically decreased during recent years.
7The forests of Murmansk Oblast are the northern-most forests in the Russian European
North. Out of the region’s total area in 1999, 9.5 million ha (65%) belong to the State
Forest Fund (Goslesfond).3 The State Forest Fund is subdivided into non-forest land
(45.2%) and forestland (54.8%). The latter includes unforested and forested areas,
which in turn include non-exploitable and exploitable forests.
Table 2:1. Forest resources in the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions seen in relation
to total area and growing stock, 1998.
Murmansk Oblast Arkhangelsk Oblast
Total area (million ha) 14.5 58.7
State Forest Fund (million ha) 9.8 29.3
Forested area (million ha) 5.2 21.6
Growing stock (million m3) 198.1 2392.1
Source: Murmansk Forest Management (1999); IIASA Russian Forest Study Database.
In Table 2:1 we want to show the different conditions of forest recourses in Murmansk
Oblast compared to one of the most intensive forest regions in Russia, Arkhangelsk
Oblast. First of all, Arkhangelsk is a much larger region and only 50 percent of its
territory belong to the State Forest Fund. The corresponding figure for Murmansk
Oblast is 65 percent.  The Forested Area constitutes 73 percent of the State Forest Fund
in Arkhanglsk, while the figure for Murmansk is only 53 percent.  The conditions can
best be seen if we compare the growing stock in the two regions. The figure in
Murmansk Oblast is under 200 million m3 while the growing stock of Arkhangelsk
Oblast is nearly 2,400 million m3. This difference is the result of different climatic
conditions and productivity of the forest in the two regions.
Forests of the State Forest Fund are divided into three groups according to their location
and functions.
Table 2:2. Distribution of the forest fund in Murmansk by group classification, 1998.
Group Million m3 Million ha % of forest fund
Group I 112.9 6.274 64
Group II 0 0 0
Group III 85.2 3.506 36
Source: Murmansk Forest Management (1999).
According to the existing classification forests having protective functions are referred
to Group I. Group II includes forests combining protective and economic functions,
usually situated near densely populated areas. Forests belonging to Group III are the
main source of industrial timber. In Murmansk, the majority of the forests belong to
                                               
3
 The remaining area of the region (not included in the forest fund) belongs to other proprietors. One of
the largest is the Ministry of Defence.
8Group I, while no Group II forests exist. The percentage distribution is 64 percent for
Group I and 36 percent of Group III.
There are no private forests in Murmansk Oblast. Here the situation resembles all the
other Russian regions. The Federal Forest Service (FFS) owns the Forest Fund through
its regional subdivisions. The Regional Forest Management in Murmansk Oblast (with
its 10 local subdivisions, leskhozy) is responsible for management of the areas. Only
two of the leskhozy — Murmanskii and Lovozerskii — lack industrial forests of Group
III on their territory. The area of especially protected territories is 311,300 ha (including
three natural reserves “Kandalakshskii”, “Laplandskii”, and “Pasvik”).
Forests located on areas submitted to the Ministry of Defence as well as those within
urban borders are not incorporated in the Forest Fund.
Species Composition
The harsh climatic conditions and the poor soils of the Kola Peninsula bring about the
peculiarities of the region’s forests, which are characterized by low density and low
productivity. The northern part of the forests is regarded as tundra, southward —
pretundra and then taiga. The three zones are evenly distributed and account for 34, 33
and 33 percent of the territory respectively.
The variety in species composition is low (Mal’kova and Peshev, 1997). The main
species are pine, spruce and birch. As seen in Diagram 2:1 and Table 2:3, pine and
spruce dominate the total forest stands with a rather high percentage of birch and a
negligible share of aspen and larch. The forest stands can be measured in two ways; in
hectares and cubic meters. The term forested area tells us the extension of the area
where the different spices are located and this is measured in hectares. The term
growing stock refers to the density of the forests and is measured in cubic meters. In
Diagram 2:1, spruce constitute 42 percent of the growing stock but only 30 percent of
the forested area. This means that the spruce stands are more compact and dense
compared to, for instance, the birch stands that covers 26 percent of the area but only 14
percent of growing stock.
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Diagram 2:1 Species composition of the forest fund in Murmansk Oblast. Percent.
(Source: Murmansk Forest Management, 1998.)
9Table 2:3. Species composition in Murmansk Oblast in 1993 compared to the rest of
Northwest Russia for forests managed by the Federal Forest Service of the Russian
Federation (percent of forested area and percent of growing stock).
Species NorthwestRussia Murmansk
Arkh-
angelsk Vologda Komi Karelia
Area Stock
-ing
Area Stock
-ing
Area Stock
-ing
Area Stock
-ing
Area Stock
-ing
Area Stock
-ing
Pine 31.99 28.61 43.33 44.53 27.20 25.22 24.99 24.55 24.94 22.56 64.0 58.3
Spruce 47.96 54.13 30.45 41.68 56.91 65.33 29.67 31.07 56.21 60.91 25.6 32.0
Fir 0.22 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.66 0.0 0.0
Larch 0.37 0.47 0.01 0.00 0.28 0.42 0.02 0.01 0.69 0.82 0.0 0.0
Birch 17.30 13.31 26.19 13.78 14.55 7.81 37.14 35.36 15.29 11.35 9.7 8.8
Aspen 2.16 3.22 0.01 0.01 1.06 1.22 8.18 9.00 2.33 3.71 0.7 0.9
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Carlsson et al. (1999b).
The average age of forests in Murmansk Oblast is rather high (103 years) but under
these northern conditions stands of 180–200 years are not over-mature by their physical
properties. The stands can still be used for industrial harvests.
Table 2:4. Development of mature and overmature stock of the state forest fund in
Murmansk.
Year
Total forest
fund area,
million ha
Mature and overmature
forested area Growing stock
Million ha
% of total
forest fund
area
Total,
million m3
mature and
over-mature,
%
1969 9.81 2.25 23.0 238 54.6
1978 9.64 1.95 20.2 186 53.8
1988 9.52 2.11 22.2 201 57.8
1993 9.49 2.08 21.9 200 56.9
1999 9.47 2.06 21.8 198 56.5
Source: Murmansk Forest Management (1999).
As shown in Table 2:4, the shares of mature and over-mature stands of the total growing
stock in the region was stable (more than 50%) throughout the period. Its area, however,
only accounted for slightly more than 30 percent of the total Forest Fund. The
difference can be explained by low density of forest stands in the region.
Clear cutting prevailed, as harvesting methods and regeneration were not sufficient. By
1970 the most productive pine stands were harvested. The valuable species were over-
cut mainly during the construction of the Oktyabrskaia railroad and along rivers and
10
lakes. While the most valuable pine stands were intensively harvested, exploitation of
over-mature spruce only accounted for 20–30 percent of the cutting (Mal’kova and
Peshev, 1997). Later, however, the overutilization of mature pine led to the exploitation
of spruce resources. Their share in harvesting volumes increased from 10 percent in
1970 to 35 percent in 1983 and 50 percent and more in the 1990s. Birch stands have no
commercial value in the region due to insufficient stock per hectare and a very low
productivity.
Forests in the region are highly affected by various diseases which, together with the
harvesting methods and industrial pollution, make forest conditions as well as stock
productivity worse.
Harvesting
Harvesting in Murmansk Oblast was especially intensive in the 1960s when production
volumes were higher than 2 million m3. Since the 1970s, harvesting has been slightly
decreasing until the beginning of the 1990s when volumes started to decrease
significantly. Between 1992 and 1998 commercial harvesting was reduced from 11,448
to 1,318 hectares annually and production of commercial wood dropped from 690,000
m
3
 to 97,800 m3 (Goskomstat Murmansk, 1996; Murmansk Forest Management, 1998).
The concept of Annual Allowable Cut (AAC) is the measurement used for establishing
sustainable levels of harvesting. The first reduction of the annual allowable cut
happened in 1983 (from 1,260,000 m3 to 875,000 m3) and it was even more reduced in
the subsequent years. In 1998 compared with 1980, the AAC was reduced by 58
percent, and since 1996 it amounts to 691,900 m3, of which not more than 25 percent is
used annually (Regional Program “Forests of Murmansk Oblast”). The AAC decline
was caused by earlier overuse of mature and over-mature stands as well as by a decrease
in demand for timber products.
Table 2:5. Utilization of annual allowable cut in Murmansk Oblast.
Year Utilization of AAC, %
1960 103.0
1970 108.6
1980 78.2
1985 90.9
1990 92.0
1991 79.0
1992 61.0
1993 25.0
1996 26.4
Source: Mal’kova and Peshev (1997).
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From Table 2:5 we can see that, although overuse of valuable pine resources has taken
place, the annual allowable cut has not been considerably exceeded throughout the years
and it has especially fallen dramatically during recent years after the disintegration of
the forest industry complex in the region.
Table 2:6. Harvesting in Murmansk Oblast 1992–1998.
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1998
Industrial harvesting:
     Area, ha
     Volume, m3
11,448
690,000
9.193
532,000
2,878
198,000
2,983
192,000
2,870
183,000
1,318
97,800
Sanitary cuttings:
     Area, ha
     Volume, m3
3,321
54,000
2,939
41,100
2,561
32,100
2,319
43,400
2,537
40,800
2,765
46,800
Annual allowable cut, m3 773 860.5 791.6 706.7 691.9 691.9
Source: Goskomstat Murmansk (1997).
As seen in Table 2:6 industrial harvesting has continuously decreased over the years
because of the deep economic crisis experienced by the forest industry in Murmansk.
Sanitary cuttings are fulfilled by subdivisions of the Murmansk Forest Management
(leskhozy) and their volumes are relatively stable. As a result, in 1998 the area of
sanitary cuttings (2,765 ha) more than twice exceeded that of industrial harvesting areas
(1,318 ha). However, in contrast to industrial harvesting where clear-cut dominates
(90%), sanitary cuttings are mostly selective which gives smaller volumes harvested.
Forest regeneration in the region includes artificial reforestation and assistance to
natural reforestation with the latter prevailing. Seeds used for seedlings are delivered
from other regions and often grow slowly or die. Although pine is basically harvested
(72%), artificial reforestation is mostly made by spruce.
Table 2:7. Forest regeneration in Murmansk Oblast 1980–1996.
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Regenerated areas, ha 10,800 9,700 11,000 11,900 9,950 11,901 13,590 13,592 7,573
Planting and sowing, ha n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,478 1,528 1,709 2,025 1,615
Of that mechanised, ha n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 674 473 792 808 715
Natural regeneration, ha 8,800 7,700 8,800 9,900 8,472 10,373 11,881 11,567 5958
Source: Goskomstat Murmansk (1997).
Reduced funding from the Federal budget caused the drastic drop in 1996. Due to the
lack of necessary machinery, much of the sowing is done by hand which takes a lot of
time and eventually has a negative effect on reforestation quality as a whole.
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Preservation or harvesting?
There is a discussion going on about the exploitation of the boreal pristine forests along the
borders to Finland and Norway. Environmental organizations and researchers from the
Institute of North Ecology Problems (Kola Science Center RAS) argue that, in contrast to
Karelia and Finland, pristine forests are still available on the Kola peninsula and must be
preserved as a valuable part of the ecosystem. This movement is being strongly supported by
the Finnish environmental organizations (Gerchina, 1999).
Murmansk Forest Management, however, as well as harvesting enterprises operating in these
areas, are of the opinion that reasonable harvesting in these forests is needed since a
considerable part of the region’s territory has already been allotted for various reserves. They
consider the intention to stop any cutting in the region as an attempt to exclude Russia from
the market and to divert attention from such serious problems as damage caused by industrial
pollution (Dvoriankin, 1997).
Ecological Problems
In general the ecological situation in Murmansk Oblast can be characterized as
unfavorable. In 1996, industry emitted into the atmosphere 505,000 tonnes of pollutants.
The most polluted areas in the region are Monchegorsk and Pechenga districts due to
two large enterprises of the Russian stock company (RAO) “Norilskiy Nickel”
producing non-ferrous and precious metals, namely the SC “GMK Pechenganickel” and
SC “Kombinat Severonickel” which are located ion these areas. These companies emit
the major part of the atmospheric pollution (76% in 1996). The highest level of effluents
and soil contamination is also registered here. The companies are sources of various
cancerogenic substances, first of all heavy metals, affecting the environment.
Concentration of large, ecologically dangerous productions, out-of-date technology and
ineffective purification installations has resulted in considerable damage to the
surrounding areas. The situation is aggravated by the circumstance that nature is
ecologically vulnerable due to the unfavorable geographic and climatic conditions.
Nature's assimilating ability is considerably lower than in central regions of Russia.
Around SC “GMK Pechenganickel” large forested areas have been devastated, ground
water and soil near the town of Zapolyarny and the settlement of Nikel have been
contaminated with heavy metals, mainly nickel. The nickel content exceeds the
maximum allowable concentration by 25 times. Transboundary pollution from this
combination negatively affects the neighboring countries (Goskomstat Murmansk,
1997).
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Table 2:8. Emission volumes from the largest companies in Murmansk Oblast in 1996.
Company Emissions, tonnes Share in total emissions inMurmansk Oblast, %
SC “GMK Pechenganikel” 246,500 48.9
SC “Kombinat Severonikel” 122,000 24.2
Source: “Zelenyi Mir” (1997).
At present the area of forests damaged by industrial pollution amounts to 13,350 ha, out
of which the area of dead forest is 7,469 ha (Regional program “Murmansk Oblast
Forests”, 1998).
Table 2:9. Annual increase of forest stands damaged by industrial pollution in
Murmansk Oblast.
Year Devastated area, ha
1993 217
1994 75
1995 65
1996 61
Source: Goskomstat Murmansk (1997).
The emission decreases are caused by production decline rather than by any efforts to
preserve the environment.
Together with soil and climatic conditions forest fires are one of the main factors
influencing forest stock condition. Fires have affected species distribution on the
peninsula, plant density, regeneration conditions as well as productivity of the forests.
The damages by forest fires to the environment are significant (Mal’kova and Peshev,
1997).
Forest fires constitute a very big problem for Forest Management. Vast areas with no
roads, lack of helicopters and financial problems hinder fire protection.
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Table 2:10. Forest fires in Murmansk Oblast 1980–1996.
Year Number of fires Area, ha
1980 521 1,804
1985 364 255
1990 178 435
1991 157 100
1992 222 2,497
1993 136 334
1994 433 813
1995 138 262
1996 126 406
Source: Mal’kova and Peshev (1997).
Infrastructure
The western part of Murmansk Oblast is industrially developed. Most of the population
is concentrated around industrial enterprises. Eastwards, the Kola Peninsula mostly
presents wilderness with only few coastal settlements. The transportation network is
unevenly distributed all over the region. Some places can only be reached by helicopter.
The road system is only well developed in the western part of the region. The total
railway length amounts to 933 km. The main lines are between St. Petersburg, Moscow
and Murmansk. In the north it ends up in the settlement of Nickel and in the west in the
town of Kovdor.
The length of roads with hard cover is 2,300 km. The highway runs from Murmansk
through Karelia to St. Petersburg. Of great importance are roads connecting the region
to Norway and Finland. In general, the roads are of low quality, many lack hard cover
and are poorly maintained.
Table 2:11. Total road (with hard cover) and railway density in 1996, km/1,000 km2.
Russia North Russia Arkhangelsk Murmansk
Railways 9.2 10.8 7.8 6.5
Roads 40.9 28.3 15.5 15.9
Sources: Carlsson et al. (1999b); Goskmostat Murmansk (1996).
The road density in Murmansk Oblast is low compared with Russia as a whole and
North Russia, although it is close to the Arkhangelsk figures.
Murmansk Oblast has two harbors — in Kandalaksha and Murmansk. The latter is
much more important for the regional economy. This is a non-freezing port annually
handling 5.4 million tonnes of cargo. Currently, however, waterways are not used for
timber export.
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Running effective forestry and rational forest use are impossible without developing an
adequate transportation system in the forest fund. At present the forest road network in
the region is extremely insufficient and only amounts to 0.08 km per 100 km2 of the
Forest fund lands. This figure is very much lower than what is regarded as an optimum,
0.5 km forest roads/km2 (Strakhov et al., 1996:95). Recently, the construction of forest
roads practically stopped.
Thus it can be concluded that considerable investments are needed to develop the forest
road system in the region.
Summary
The conditions of the Murmansk forest resources and the physical environment can be
summarized as follows:
• More than half of the region’s forests is referred to Group I forests, which means
they have protective functions. Forest stands are characterized by low density and
productivity.
• The species composition is simple with a predominance of coniferous stands.
• The share of mature and overmature forests in the total growing stock in the region is
more than 50 percent, while it only accounts for slightly more than 20 percent of the
Forest Fund area.
• A dramatic drop in industrial harvesting took place between 1992 and 1998, while
sanitary cuttings have been relatively stable.
• At present, areas of sanitary cuttings exceed those of industrial harvesting.
• Around 90 percent of all industrial harvesting is still made in the form of clear
cutting.
• Industrial pollution, pests, diseases and forest fires cause significant loss of forest
resources.
• The region lacks efficient forest road network development, which requires
considerable investments.
3. Socioeconomic Characteristics of Murmansk Oblast
Murmansk Oblast is a sparsely populated territory with a population density of only 7.5
persons per km2. The total population of the region is just above one million (0.7% of
the Russian population). Urban settlements (company towns) based on huge mineral
resources dominate the region. The most important towns for mining and metallurgical
production are Apatity, Kirovsk, Monchegorsk, Nickel and Zapolyarny. Other important
activities that form the basis for towns, are military presence and particularly the
Northern Fleet that has important bases in the fjords by the Barents Sea shore. Most
important is the town of Severomorsk with shipyards for repair of the military and
commercial fleet. Fishing, food processing, and shipping are the main activities in the
regional capital city of Murmansk. Slightly more than 92 percent of the population lives
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in one of the 16 towns and 20 rural settlements, which is a very high degree of
urbanization in relation to the Russian average.
Table 3:1. The largest towns in Murmansk Oblast (1,000 inhabitants).
Towns 1,000 inhabitants
Murmansk 390
Apatity 72
Monchegorsk 61
Severomorsk 58
Kandalaksha 48
Source: Luzin (1999).
The Russian population dominates the region with 83 percent of the inhabitants. Other
important nationalities are Ukrainians (9%) and Belorussians (3%). The region has a
traditional Saami indigenous population that is in danger of disappearing with less than
2,000 people. Nenets and Komi people have immigrated to the region from their home
areas, and have traditionally worked together with the Saami population in reindeer
herding in the middle and eastern part of the region. The Karelians constitute a small
component of the population in the southern part of the region close to the Karelian
Republic.
Russians
Ukrainians
Belorussians
Others
Diagram 3:1. Ethnic composition of Murmansk Oblast 1989. (Source: Goskomstat
Murmansk, 1996.)
Changes in the Demographic Situation
Murmansk is the region in Northwest Russia that has been most seriously hit by a
negative demographic trend in population. The main reasons are low birth and high
death rates that have lead to lower total life expectancy. A second reason is that many
people are moving to the south.
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The region is currently, like the rest of Russia, experiencing a drop in birth rates and an
increase in death rates. This is a typical feature of countries in economic crisis. It is hard
and expensive to raise children and economic problems and unemployment have an
effect on lifestyle and alcohol abuse that again cause lower life expectancy. The average
death rate in 1995 in Murmansk Oblast (11.4 per thousand) was lower than the Russian
average level of 14 per 1,000. The birth rate in the region dropped from 10 to 7.2 at the
beginning of the 1990s, but increased again to 8.1 in 1995. Although the balance
between birth and death rates is negative, the situation in Murmansk is not so dramatic
as in other parts of Russia, but worse than in other parts of Northwest Russia.
Table 3:2. Birth and death rates in Murmansk Oblast (per 1,000 inhabitants)
1991–1995.
1991 1993 1995 AverageRussia 1995
Birth rate 10.0 7.2 8.1 9.3
Death rate 6.1 10.1 11.4 14
Balance 3.9 -2.9 -3.3 -5.6
Source: Goskomstat Murmansk (1996).
Changes in birth and death rates affect life expectancy figures. Between 1990 and 1995,
life expectancy dropped by 7.6 years for men and 4 years for women. One explanation
for this severe development could be the collapse of the safety net mainly affecting the
old and weak portion of the population. Pensions became impossible to live on because
of rising food-prices. The quality of medical treatment dropped and patients had to start
paying for services. Another explanation is the lifestyle that the economic problems
have caused with increasing alcohol problems and suicide among the population. From
1996, this serious development changed and life expectancy increased again. It is
uncertain if this positive tendency will continue, as life has not become easier during the
last few years. Quite the opposite; the August 1998 crisis has probably made it even
worse, but figures for this period are not yet available.
Table 3:3. Change in life expectancy in the Murmansk Oblast 1978–1996.
Men Women
1978–79 61.5 72.9
1989–90 65.3 74.4
1995 57.7 70.4
1996 60.1 71.5
Source: Goskomstat Murmansk (1998b).
The changes in death rates and life expectancy are not necessarily completely related to
adverse living standards. One other explanation could be the age structure of the
population. More people of old age will naturally lead to higher death rates, as their
health is poorer than the average. One explanation for more old-aged people is that
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more old people and pensioners stay until they die in the Murmansk region, while others
left earlier for the south and contributed to the death rate in some other region.
Migration from the Murmansk Oblast is nothing new. People saw the stay in the north
as temporary and usually left when they became pensioners for an easier life in the
south. The peak in 1992 can partly be explained by the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Many Ukrainians and Belorussians left to be sure of obtaining citizenship in the new
independent states.4
Table 3:4. Population migration in Murmansk Oblast, 1991–1995.
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Immigration 46,594 36,966 34,562 43,744 36,395
Emigration 55,916 63,075 57,447 57,432 52,412
Balance -9,322 -26,109 -22,885 -13,688 -16,017
Source: Goskomstat Murmansk (1996; 1998a).
The demographic changes (caused by birth rates, death rates and migration) are summed
up in Diagram 3:1. Compared to other regions in the North, Murmansk Oblast has
experienced the biggest negative change in the population from 1987 to 1995 with more
than 7 percent. The average of the northern regions was a 3 percent negative change for
the same period.
:HVW6LEHULD
.DUHOLD
.RPL
9RORJGD
0XUPDQVN
(DVW6LEHULD
5XVVLD
$UNKDQJHOVN
1RUWK5HJLRQ
)DU(DVW
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
Diagram 3:1. Changes in population between 1987 and 1995. Percent. (Source:
Carlsson et al., 1999b.)
                                               
4
 See, Heleniak (1999) for data on net migration from Northern Russia and the reasons for the develop-
ment.
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The Educational Level
The region has a limited number of higher education institutions. An important factor
has been the high number of specialists that have been educated in other parts of Russia
who then moved to the Murmansk region. This was an element of the Soviet system
where students were given free education and were then (to some extent) able to choose
among some distant cites to contribute to the “industrial adventure”. Murmansk Oblast
was quite popular, as it was not as far from central Russia as, for instance, Siberia. The
graduates were given their own apartments and relatively good salaries. This tendency
can be found in the statistical material where Murmansk is the region in Northwest
Russia with the highest number of specialists with higher education (56 per 1,000
inhabitants in 1989). This is on the same level as the average for the Russian Federation.
The discrepancy can be seen in the figures of students where Murmansk Oblast has the
lowest number of students per 10,000 inhabitants in Northwest Russia with only 63. In
comparison, the average number in the Russian federation is 171 and the neighboring
Republic of Karelia has twice as many students as Murmansk Oblast.
Table 3:5. Number of specialists and students in Northwest Russia.
Region
Specialists with higher
education per 1,000
inhabitants in 1989
Students per 10,000
inhabitants in 1993
Russian Federation 56 171
Murmansk 56 63
Arkhangelsk 44 96
Karelia 55 121
Komi 50 88
Vologda 45 128
Source: IIASA Institutional Framework Database.
There have not been many possibilities to obtain a higher technical education for work
in the specialized industry in the region. As a result, many young people left for St.
Petersburg, Petrozavodsk or other Russian cities for education. The system of allocating
graduated students to specific work has now ended and students are free to go wherever
they wish after graduation. Nevertheless, the higher educational system in Murmansk
Oblast has been through some reorganization during the last few years and more
possibilities have opened for young students. The former State College has been split,
private institutions have emerged, and new branches of Universities have been founded.
Now, there are three higher education institutions located in Murmansk city: the State
Technical University, the Humanitarian Institute, and the Pedagogical Institute.
Recently, a branch of the St. Petersburg Academy of Engineering and Economics was
founded in Apatity, which teaches management and economics. There is also a branch
of the Petrozavodsk University dealing with economics, law and management.
The total number of students in Murmansk Oblast has increased during the last few
years due to these new educational institutions. There are more possibilities for
education in the region. Many universities and institutes outside the region now demand
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payment for higher education and it has become more expensive for students to live
separated from their parents. There are reasons to believe that the region in some years
will soon have a better foundation for educating its own specialists. In any case, the
subjects are not particularly related to the profile of the industry in the region but more
to management skills in general. The question is whether these students will find the
work they want or are educated for in Murmansk Oblast.
Murmansk City also hosts the research institute PINRO (Knipovich Polar Research
Institute of Marine Fisheries and Oceanography). In Apatity, we find the Kola Science
Center (KSC, the regional department of the Academy of Sciences) primarily dealing
with mineral resources. KSC includes ten different institutes.
There is no higher educational institution in the region that provides a specific education
in forestry. None of the research institutes are particularly working on the theme either.
The only one with some specialists is the Institute of Economic Problems (IEP) and the
Institute of Northern Ecological Problems (INEP) in the Kola Science Center.
Changes in the Workforce
The negative changes in the demographic situation have affected the number of people
who are of working age. In addition, there are some other important reasons for the
decreasing number of employees in the region; an ageing population with more
pensioners and growing unemployment.
When it was industrialized, people coming from southern Russian regions and other
Soviet republics inhabited the region. The first generation often kept their apartment in
the south and moved back when they became pensioners. The region therefore had a
high turnover and a young population of working age. This tendency has somewhat
changed during the last few decades. Most second and third generation Kola inhabitants
have lost their connection to the south and have nowhere to return when they retire. This
has caused a new situation where the numbers of pensioners and non-working portion of
the population are increasing.
The economically active part of the population has dropped from 600,000 to 540,000
during the period 1992–1996 but slightly increased in 1997. The reason for this has
already been explained in the previous sections about the demographic situation.
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Diagram 3:3. Economically active population in Murmansk, 1,000 people. (Source:
Goskomstat Murmansk, 1996, 1998a.)
The period of transition has coincided with the privatization of former state enterprises
and the need for running business more efficiently. Some labor-intensive industries have
cut down on the number of workers and both old and new enterprises experience
bankruptcy when markets fail. The number of people without stable and regular work
has increased during the 1990s. The official registration of unemployment increased
from 5.3 percent in 1992 to 19.8 percent in 1997. This can look like a rather high
number, but the real figure is probably even higher and we must be aware of the
uncertainty of the figures. First, many would probably not bother to sign up in the
unemployment queue, as the chances of getting new work or social payments are small.
On the other hand, unofficial employment is quite widespread and some of the people in
the unemployment queue might work illegally and still make a living.
Economic Structure
Murmansk is a region where the industry is important. In terms of employment, the
industrial employment’s share of the workforce has decreased from 33.6 percent in
1991 to 29.9 percent in 1997. Economic branches that have experienced serious drops in
employment are construction (from 15.5 to 5.8%), and agriculture and transport. Public
services such as education, health, social sphere, and administration, have experienced a
stable development or even increasing employment.
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Table 3:6. Distribution of the working population by branches of the economy
1991–1997 (1,000 people).
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Total 559.8 568.1 519.5 493.0 471.7 450.5 431.4
Industry 187.6 173.3 168.4 151.5 141.9 137.5 125.8
Agriculture 12.0 12.0 11.6 10.8 9.5 7.9 8.3
Forestry 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5
Transport 45.7 47.4 43.4 43.8 40.1 38.9 36.3
Communications 7.8 7.5 7.4 7.7 7.5 7.4 7.0
Construction 86.7 80.9 52.5 47.7 41.9 28.1 25.0
Trade, public catering,
supply
52.8 57.0 56.6 58.2 54.9 48.4 57.3
Market organizations - 0.5 0.9 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.9
Geology 5.6 5.1 4.1 3.6  4.0 5.1 4.1
Management of public
housing, non-productive
forms of domestic service
28.7 29.2 31.7 31.9 31.2 31.5 32.4
Health, sport, social
activities
35.2 38.8 38.9 39.0 38.6 39.6 38.1
Education 47.2 54.9 52.9 47.7 45.7 45.5 43.3
Culture and art 8.2 9.0 8.9 8.7 8.9 8.2 7.7
Research 8.4 8.5 8.5 6.7 6.6 5.8 5.0
Finances, banking,
insurance
4.1 4.5 4.6 5.7 6.0 5.0 4.5
Public administration 21.1 21.0 22.2 22.9 27.1 32.7 30.3
Other branches 6.9 17.8 6.3 5.8 6.3 7.3 3.9
Source: Goskomstat Murmansk (1998a).
The forestry figures in Table 3:6 only contain those involved in forest management
(Murmansk Forest Management and leskhozy). Employment in this sector is rather
stable and constitutes only 0.1 percent of employment during the whole period.
Industrial Development
The industrial branches in Murmansk Oblast employed about 431,000 persons in 1997.
The food industry (fish industry included) and non-ferrous metallurgy are the most
important sectors with more than 21 percent of employment in each. Other important
branches are the machine building and chemical industries with 16 percent and 14
percent respectively. In terms of employment changes, the machine building, food
industry and building materials experienced the largest decrease from 1996 to 1997.
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Diagram 3:4. Industrial structure in Murmansk Oblast 1997. Employment in different
branches in percent of total industrial employment. (Source: Goskomstat Murmansk,
1998a.)
The shares of the output produced by the industries in Murmansk Oblast in 1997 does
not always correspond with their shares of employment. The non-ferrous metallurgy
industry contributed to 36 percent of the value of industrial output, with 21 percent of
the labor force. Electricity occupies second place with 24 percent of the value and 10
percent of employment. At the other end of the scale we find machine building that has
16 percent of employment and only 5 percent of total value. The food industry is also
very labor intensive with 14 percent of the value and 22 percent of employment.
Salaries
The average salary has grown from 55 US dollars in 1992 to 286 US dollars in 1997.5
This is an extensive increase but at the same time prices and living costs have grown
dramatically. If the average monthly salary is seen in relation to prices, the average
purchasing power grew until 1993. Then it started to reduce and in 1997 it was 79
percent of the 1991 level.
The salaries in Murmansk Oblast have traditionally been higher than the Russian
average. This is due to special compensations that were given in the North and a
                                               
5
 Because of inflation and devaluation, average monthly salaries were calculated using the current dollar
exchange rate.
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generally higher level of salary in the metallurgy industry. Columns 4 and 5 in Table 3:7
show the average monthly salary and social payments in relation to the minimum
subsistence level in Murmansk Oblast and the Russian average. In 1997, the salaries in
Murmansk were 293 percent of the official minimum subsistence level, while the
average Russian figure was 219 percent.
Table 3:7. Salaries in Murmansk Oblast 1991–1997.
Salary* in relation to minimum
subsistence standard in %Monthly
average salary
in USD
Actual salary
in relation to
prices in
% of 1991 Murmansk Oblast Russia average
1991 … 100 … …
1992 55 104 … 299
1993 120 128 354 278
1994 190 103 257 248
1995 187 74 198 179
1996 273 79 266 197
1997 286 79 293 217
* Includes both salary and social payments.
Source: Goskomstat Murmansk (1998a).
The ruble devaluation in August 1998 dramatically changed the value of salaries in
relation to dollars and in relation to average purchasing power. In any case, all these
figures must be treated with some skepticism as they only take into account the official
salary. Many people have unofficial incomes that will never be shown in any statistical
information.
People working in the electricity branch have the highest income with nearly 3.3 million
1997 rubles a month. Other high-ranking branches are ferrous metallurgy and flour
production. The lowest paid are people working in the light industry6 with only 877,000
rubles. The second lowest paid are workers in the harvesting and forest processing
industry with 1.09 million rubles per month. This is only half of the average salary in
Murmansk Oblast. These figures only include the industrial part of the forest sector
(harvesting and processing) excluding forest management in the leskhozy.
                                               
6
 The Russian term light industry includes textile production.
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Table 3:8. Salaries in various branches in Murmansk Oblast in 1997 (1,000 rubles).
Branch Average salary
Electricity 3,298
Ferrous metallurgy 1,970
Non-ferrous metallurgy 2,285
Chemical 1,709
Machine building and processing 1,588
Forest and forest processing industry 1,091
Building material industry 1,260
Light industry 877
Food industry 1,542
Flour production 2,008
Printing industry 1,303
Average salary 1,931
Source: Goskomstat Murmansk (1998a).
Summary
• Murmansk Oblast has a high proportion (92.3%) of people living in urban
settlements that were built after the revolution and based on the region’s rich mineral
resources.
• Murmansk is the region in Northwestern Russia with the most serious negative
demographic changes. Most important are emigration, low birth rates, and low life
expectancy.
• The region has the highest number of educated specialists among the Northwestern
regions due to the inflow of experts. At the same time, the region has the lowest
number of students in higher education establishments.
• Demographic changes have reduced the economically active part of the population.
The workforce has been reduced as official unemployment reached nearly 20 percent
in 1997.
• The industrial sector still dominates the economic structure of the region, although its
share of the total workforce reduced to less than 30 percent in 1997. Food processing
and non-ferrous metallurgy occupies the leading positions in employment.
• Murmansk is still a region with high salaries, although the difference in relation to
the Russian average has decreased in the second half of the 1990s.
• The highest salaries among the industrial branches are found in electricity and non-
ferrous metallurgy; the lowest in the light industry and the forest and forest
processing industry.
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4. Management in Murmansk Forestry — Rules in Use
This chapter describes the institutional changes in forest management of Murmansk
Oblast. We begin with a historical overview on how forest management was
institutionalized and what rules have been in use. This description will focus on the
general federal level, followed by an explanation of the regional and local level of forest
management in Murmansk Oblast. The executive organ of the Federal Forest Service in
the region is Murmansk Forest Management. We will describe its duties, how their local
units (the leskhozy) are coping with the new tasks, and lastly, the changing economic
conditions. The relation to the regional (oblast) administration will be described, and we
conclude the chapter with a brief look into the Regional Program for Forest
Management.
Forest Management in the Tsarist Period
The Russian tsarist period up to Peter the Great can be described as a system of open
access to forest resources. There was no awareness of the forest as a limited resource
that needed protection or regulation (Malmlöv, 1997). Private property right systems
were introduced late and in practice the population had access to and could use the
forests without any official restrictions. From the late 17th century, harvesting became a
commercial activity and woods were demanded for ship and house building. Wood was
the main energy source and extensive cutting along the riverbanks and lakes caused
over-harvesting and erosion. Tsar Peter the Great was the first ruler to understand the
need for regulation and he issued the first forest-ukaz in 1703 regulating logging. About
200 forest regulations were imposed during Tsar Peter’s reign, and he introduced the
system of forest inspection in some regions after the German model.
Tsar Peter’s successors did not pay much attention to forest management. The
regulations were withdrawn, most forests were released for private ownership, and the
old tradition of open access returned. The landlords had their own ways of taking
advantage of and earning money from their forests by charging fees from the local
population for timber and firewood. Logging usually took place where the forests were
easily accessible and money could be earned quickly without bearing in mind the
sustainability of the resources. But, there was still a smaller part of the forest belonging
to the state and this was sold on stumpage auctions. In 1798, Tsar Pavel I organized the
Russian Forest Department with provincial subdivisions, local management units
(Sheingauz et al., 1995). The first attempt to introduce a unified forest management
system of the resources was made. The knowledge of sustainable management based on
scientific criteria developed with expeditions and foreign contacts. As a result, the first
federal forest tax was launched in 1898 and a huge re-plantation program was
introduced.
Forest Management in the Soviet Period
By 1917, 64 percent of the Russian forests belonged to private owners, while the rest
was state owned (Kopylova, 1999). The Russian revolution dramatically changed forest
management and resource policy. All forests were transferred to “the people” through
nationalization and expropriation of private property. Harvesting took place according
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to the perceived needs without taking into account any discussions about sustainability.
The first Soviet forest decree was adopted in 1918, and the Soviet republics followed
with their own Forest Codes. As the former system of forest management was supposed
to be part of a bourgeois tradition, the new Soviet authorities chose to break with the
forest experts. From the late 1920s, forest management was split into several Ministries
and lacked a general forest law. Forest enterprises were integrated in the central
planning system, and the sector was divided into a federal forest department with
provincial departments and local forest management units. In this period, until 1977,
there were practically no laws regulating Russian forestry. Laws were replaced by
resolutions made by the Communist party, the Central Committee and the Council of
Ministers. The Republics’ Councils made only a few resolutions as the Union level
approved 92 percent of the resolutions.
In 1947, the USSR Council of Minister adopted a unified management system for the
whole of the Soviet Union. This system remained unchanged until the Perestroika
period, except for the Khrushchev epoch with its decentralized economic management
system.
It was only in 1977 that the Soviet Union adopted a unified Forest Code that looked at
the forest management system as a whole. The administrative structure was divided into
executive, legislative and departmental levels. The changes were really not that
significant since the different resolutions adopted during the last decades had all pointed
in the same direction. Thus the Union level was responsible for (Sheingauz et al., 1995):
• the determination of main forest management principles,
• setting the annual allowable cut and making plans for forest utilization,
• the classification of forest groups,
• setting standards for the forest inventory system, and
• the control of forest utilization.
The system had one important drawback. Power was delegated to the departmental
bodies and actual decisions made by executive and legislative organs (particularly the
local ones) were not always implemented. Centralism and departmental sub-laws
dominated. This caused a non-sustainable utilization of the forest resources. The
principles of “timber-mining” were introduced where transportation was profoundly
subsidized to make it possible to develop huge production plants far away from the
consumers.
The Perestroika Period
With Mikhail Gorbachev in charge, the Central Committee and Communist Party began
to reform the forest legislation system in 1988. The main changes were that both the
federal and regional levels now had the right to utilize natural resources. The central
ministries were reorganized but the system did not function, as it was not adapted to a
new market system. When the Soviet Union disintegrated and the new Russian
Constitution was enacted, there was a need for more profound changes and the Russian
legislators started to work on the New Forest Code. The most urgent need for
clarification was the ownership question. Many regions had taken advantage of the
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weak central control and had (through regional laws) implemented control of the
resources. The other pressing issue was decentralization of forest management to local
authorities.
The code was adopted in 1997 after several reviews, but has disappointed those who
hoped for vital amendments. Although, the code sets new environmental standards
based on sustainable forest management and preservation of biological diversity Nilsson
and Shvidenko (1997) have given critical remarks of the Forest Code. The code:
• is still based on a centrally planned institutional framework,
• does not cover all the functions of forest resources, not even all of the forests in
Russia,
• is complex and difficult to implement,
• is normative and descriptive without efficient mechanisms for implementation,
• is full of loopholes that leave room for corruption,
• does not secure popular participation by efficient mechanisms, only described as a
right, and
• contradicts other legislation, regulations and the Constitution.
Laws, Regulations and Instructions
The Forest Code is now the most important law regulating forest management in
Russia. There are, nevertheless, quite a lot of other regulations and instructions that
affect more specific parts of the management. Listed below are the most important laws
and regulations affecting Russian forestry and the forest industry,7 their registration
number and date of adoption.
• The Forest Code (Code No. 22-F3, 29/1/1997).
• Statute of Timber Auction Holding Regulations (Order No. 99, 11/8/1997).
• Statute of Forest Competition Regulations for Assignments of Forest Stock Parcels
for Leasing (Order No. 123, 30/9/1997).
• Government Resolution on Leasing of a Forest Parcel (No. 345, 24/3/1998).
• Regulations for Leasing Forest Fund Parcels (Order No. 55, 8/4/1998).
• Rules for Selling Standing Wood (Resolution No. 551, 1/6/1998).
• Instructions for Sanitary Cutting in the Russian Federation (Order No. 1458,
27/1/1998).
• Government Resolution on Minimum Payment Rates for Standing Timber Bought on
Stump (Resolution No. 1199, 19/9/1997).
• Statute on Specially Protected Areas (Law No. 33-F3, 14/3/1995).
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 List borrowed from Pappila (1999).
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• Statute on Environmental Protection (Law No. 2060-1, 19.12.1991; amendments in
1992 and 1993).
• Statute on Ecological Expertiza (Law No. 174-F3, 23/11/1995).
Forest Management in Russia Today
The Russian Government and its executive organ, the State Committee for Environ-
mental Protection,8 heads the whole forest complex. The central body for forest manage-
ment is the Federal Forest Service (FFS — Rosleskhoz). The organization consists of 81
regional units, mainly following the administrative structure of the federation. On the
federal level the FFS has the following tasks:
• to prepare laws considering forest utilization, regeneration, protection and control,
• to organize state inspections of the condition and utilization of forests,
• to run research institutions and be responsible for international cooperation in
forestry,
• to prepare federal programs for forest sector development,
• to make forest resource accounts and forest monitoring,
• to carry out forest regeneration, reforestation, airborne and ground-based forest
protection and forest use control,
• to approve annual allowable cut (AAC) for final forest harvesting (in agreement with
local executive organs and the State Committee),
• to determine norms on expenditures for forestry activities,
• to finance forestry activities by subordinated organs,
• to train and educate forestry personnel,
• to set up sectional tariff agreements, and
• to control the book-keeping of forest management bodies and compile summary
accounts to be submitted to the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economics, the
State Committee for Statistics, and the State Taxation Service.
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 Former Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources.
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Figure 4.1. Forest Management structure of the Russian Federation. (Source: Based on
Burdin et al., 1998.)
Forest Management in Murmansk Oblast
Murmansk Forest Management is one of 81 regional units of the Federal Forest Service.
Murmansk Forest Management’s main office9 is located in Murmansk City. It
implements the resolutions and forest policy of the Ministry and the FFS in the region.
It serves as an umbrella and coordinating body for the ten management units (leskhozy)
on the local level.
The main tasks of the Murmansk Forest Management is to:
 prepare legislation on forest management in the region,
 provide state control of the condition, utilization, regeneration and protection of
forests along with the regional (oblast) administration and the State Committee on
Environmental Protection,
 make forest accounting,
 organize forest tenders,
 organize regeneration and forest protection,
 prepare proposals for local executive organs on the distribution of harvesting areas,
 fund leskhozy according to Federal budgetary requirements, distributed by the FFS
of Russia,
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 obtain funding for leskhozy from local budgets,
 involve the local population in forest fire control,
 prevent illegal forest use, and
 prosecute enterprises and citizens who illegally cut timber.
Due to reduced finances from federal authorities, the Murmansk Forest Management
had to decrease the number of its staff. The total number of employees (leskhozy
included) used to be 1,500 at the beginning of the decade, but is now as low as
approximately 500. Of these, 280 are engaged in forest protection.10
The financial source for the activity of the Murmansk Forest Management has changed
dramatically. In Soviet times, the federal authorities covered 70 percent of the expenses,
in 1998 they financed 40 percent. Consequently, even more of the work must be
financed through other incomes. In practice this means that much time and effort goes
into making arrangements that can generate money to the daily tasks and salaries of
Murmansk Forest Management.
Table 4.1. Financial sources of the Murmansk Forest Management 1997–1998.
Percent.
1997 1998
Federal budget 66 40
Regional and local budgets - 2
Own sources 34 58
Source: Regional Program “Forest of Murmansk Oblast” (1997); Interview with Murmansk Forest
Management (1998).
The Murmansk Forest Management sees some new opportunities to find new incomes.
According to the new law, forest rangers are now allowed to bear weapons and intensify
the search of illegal forest harvesting, hunting and fishing. In 1998, about 300 people
were prosecuted for different violations, and those penalties have brought some money
back to the forest management. Salmon fishing is popular in the pristine rivers of the
region. Development of tourism and selling of fishing licenses to foreigners can also
bring some extra money. This is stated as an uncomplicated matter by the Murmansk
Forest Management, but has been a source of conflict with the indigenous Saami
population, which has used the rivers as a source of income for generations. Other
Russian residents might also be deprived of their fishing rights when rich foreigners buy
them out.
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 Interview with Murmansk Forest Management in March 1999.
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The Role of the Leskhozy
The local forest management is conducted by the 10 leskhozy in Murmansk Oblast.11 A
director and a chief forester (glavny lesnichii) head the leskhoz main office. It is usually
situated in the center of the district and has a staff of secretaries and accountants.
Forest Management
Leskhoz
Forest District
(Lesnichestvo)
Compartments
(Uchastki)
T
ending plots
Figure 4.2. Geographical division of the leskhozy.
Each leskhoz is divided into 2 or 3 forest districts (lesnichestvo) that are located in forest
villages. A forester (lesnichii) leads the lesnichestvo and has brigades working in
compartments (uchastki). Each brigade is headed by a foreman who has some forest
workers. These workers tend the plots.
The leskhozy have also gone through changes in their operations and tasks during the
period of transition. In the Soviet period they had three main tasks, namely to:
1. Survey the forest resources.
2. Perform silvicultural operations.
3. Do some harvesting (industrial/sanitary cutting).
With the reforms in the management of the forest sector, the industrial harvesting tasks
have been removed from the leskhozy. In the 1970/80s, the harvesting carried out by the
leskhozy constituted about a quarter of the total harvest. Approximately 50 percent of
the harvesting in the Soviet Union were industrial (clear cutting) and the rest sanitary
cutting/thinning (Blandon, 1983:87). The substantial industrial harvest of the leskhoz
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made it necessary to have equipment and sawmills for these operations. The earnings
the leskhozy received from selling the timber to lespromkhozy and other customers were
invested in the social infrastructure of the villages (housing, hospitals, etc.). After the
management reform, this most important source of income for the leskhoz in the
Murmansk Oblast was taken away. The leskhoz was, in principle, not allowed to do any
clear cutting and the sales from sanitary cutting was not sufficient to cover the expenses
in the other tasks. The sawmills that were built at the leskhozy, when they had industrial
harvesting rights, were no longer used at their full capacity and became too expensive to
maintain for the small amount of sanitary harvests. According to our interviews with
leskhozy in Murmansk,12 most of them have leased out or sold their sawmills to other
companies.
The main tasks of the leskhozy after restructuring are to:
• undertake forest accounting,
• participate in forest inventory, planning and forest research,
• prepare classification of the forest resource according to management groups and
protection categories,
• allocate felling sites,
• prepare long and short term leasing contracts and auctions, and grant corresponding
harvesting licenses,
• undertake thinning and sanitary harvests,
• regenerate low-value stands, have seed orchards and nurseries,
• provide forest protection,
• provide state control of the condition, utilization, regeneration, and protection of the
forests, and
• organize the utilization of forest by-products, timber-processing.
Economic Problems of the Leskhozy
After the important income from industrial harvesting was taken away from the
leskhozy, they have faced financial problems. This should be compensated by the
federal allocation of financial resources. We listed earlier the financial distribution of
funds for forest management from the Federal Forest Service to the Murmansk Forest
Management. The latter should, in turn, distribute part of the centrally allocated money
to the leskhozy. According to information obtained through our interviews, only 28
percent of the income of the leskhozy came from federal authorities in 1998.13 As the
support from local and regional (oblast) level are minimal (or mainly non-monetary),
the leskhozy must find their own resources to maintain their tasks at a reasonable level.
So how do they cope in this difficult period, where can they find additional income?
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 Interviews were made in April–May 1999 with 6 of the existing 10 leskhozy in the region.
13
 This was stated in some of the leskhozy we visited, but the figures can vary from leskhoz to leskhoz. The
Murmansk Forest Service nevertheless confirmed the figure as an average in March 1999.
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Our investigation reveals the following sources:
• sale of firewood to the local population,
• sale of timber from intermediary/sanitary harvests,
• penalties for illegal hunting and fishing,14
• fees for hunting and fishing,
• some lease their sawmills to private companies,
• sale of equipment and machinery,
• sale of harvesting licenses connected to auctions/leasing (registration fee),
• stumpage income (that exceeds the minimal fee) from forest leasing and auctions,
and
• sale of maps.
For the moment, payments for timber from intermediate or sanitary harvests are the
most important source of income for the leskhoz. These harvests must not necessarily be
done by the leskhoz itself. Quite the opposite, they can hire private firms to do the job
for them and the leskhoz is paid for the harvested timber. This timber is easier to sell
than wood from industrial harvesting plots since it is exempted from forest fees, even if
harvesting is performed by a commercial forest leaseholder.15
Some leskhozy have income from harvesting rights sold to harvesting companies
through leasing or auction.16 The leskhozy only receive income from this activity if the
plot is sold for more than the minimal stumpage fee set by the federal level. There are
small chances for extra payments due to low competition and there is seldom more than
one interested buyer. Those who can make some money are the leskhozy in the
southwest where markets are larger, forest quality is better and transportation costs are
smaller.17
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 50 percent goes to the leskhoz, 50 percent to the municipal budget.
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 Article 103 in the Forest Code.
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 The different terms of acquisition will be explained in the following chapters.
17
 Kovdozerskij leskhoz arranged an auction in April 1999 and managed to sell 3 plots for 43 rubles per
cubic meter. The initial price was 27 rubles and the leskhoz received a nice supplement to its budget.
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Can a Leskhoz Die?
The leskhozy are responsible for territories of different sizes and forest quality (see, Table
4:2). The harvesting activity therefore varies from leskhoz to leskhoz, depending upon the
market for their products, accessibility and available transportation facilities.
Kirovskii is one of ten leskhozy in Murmansk Oblast situated in the middle of the Kola
Peninsula in a mining and processing district. Kirovskii leskhoz consists of three forest
districts (lesnichestva): Apatitskoye, Kirovskoye and Verkhneumbskoye, each of which has
six forest tending plots (obkhody). The leskhoz has, as others in the forest sector, gone
through vital changes. The chief forester says that their work has been directed away from
industrial harvesting to regulating utilization, from fighting diseases and fire control to the
protection of animals. The leskhoz has, nevertheless, not sufficient economic resources to
carry out its new functions. The reason can be found in the inability of this leskhoz to find
money by its own means.
There was no industrial harvesting on the territory (Forest Fund) of the leskhoz during 1998,
and this prevented the leskhoz from earning any money from leasing contracts. The chief
forester explains that this is due to the lack of customers with too high prices (stumpage fee)
compared with central Russia. There are no solvent buyers nearby and the leskhoz is located
too far from the main markets of the region. Foreigners are not interested, as the
transportation costs will be too high. There have been some auctions arranged for plots, but
all agreements failed as the customers could not provide the money.
The leskhoz cut only 300 m3 as sanitary harvesting in 1998 and mainly sold it to the sawmill
leased by the company Rudnitskij. Until 1992, the leskhoz used to manufacture 40 different
products but had to lease out the sawmill when industrial harvesting was abolished. The most
important customer of the leskhoz is OOO Les (a former lespromkhoz), but currently they are
not interested in buying timber on prevailing terms. They have switched to another supplier,
which belongs to the Ministry of Defence. The leskhoz has a limited demand for firewood
from the local population. Those who need firewood usually help themselves without
obtaining permission from the leskhoz.
The lack of customers soon led to an economic catastrophe for the leskhoz. They no longer
had money to conduct their management tasks. The financial troubles forced the leskhoz to
reorganize and in August 1998 a proposal was made to close down the whole leskhoz and
merge it with the Zasheykovsky leskhoz. This was prevented, but they had to reduce the staff
from 42 to 27 and eliminate the lesnicestvo-level, a move that affected chief foresters at the
forest district levels.
Murmansk Regional (Oblast) Administration
The regional administration used to have a Committee of Industrial Development and a
group of specialists that was responsible for the forest sector. The administration has
been reorganized several times and the forestry department has been reduced. Until
1998, there was one person in the new Department of Industrial Development
responsible for forestry (more or less due to her own interest and initiative), but this
person has now other tasks. The Department of Production Forecasts has produced
some recommendations for the forest industry, but it works with all kinds of branches
and does not exclusively deal with the forest sector.
Clearly, the forest sector does not have any priority with the Administration and there
are in fact no people who can promote the interests of the forest sector. This
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development can be explained by the lack of pressure groups. In other regions, where
forestry is more important for the economy (for example in Arkhangelsk and Karelia), a
forestry lobby exists in the regional parliament and strong holding companies that
represent the industry. The region lacks this kind of forest lobby structures and other
branches, like fishery and metallurgy, dominate the agenda. Another reason for the
passive attitude by the regional administration is that many of the tasks related to
forestry that previously belonged to the regional administration level have been
transferred to the Murmansk Forest Management. The Murmansk Forest Management
now compiles most of the programs and resolutions related to forestry and the Governor
then signs them.
According to article 106 of the Forest Code, 60 percent of the forest tax obtained from
auctions and leasing (at the minimum stumpage fee rate) should revert to the regional
budget. The remaining 40 percent should be allocated to the federal budget. There is an
exception to this rule that affects Murmansk Oblast. All revenues should go to the
regional budget in regions with less than 1 million m3 of industrial harvesting. This
means that the regional administration receives 100 percent of the minimal stumpage
fee paid by the forest users (this income was 2.38 billion rubles in 1997).18 The leskhozy
acquire the additional sum if the agreement is set above the minimal fee. The code
further says that part of the money the region receives from the stumpage fee shall be
used for forest reproduction.
But what does the regional administration give back? Our investigation reveals that it is
virtually nothing. In 1997, no income was returned to the forest sector. The money was
used for other tasks. Two percent of the forestry activity in 1998 was financed from
regional and local budgets according to the Murmansk Forest Management.19 As far as
we know, very little of this money has been allocated by the regional administration.
State Committee on Environmental Protection
The State Committee on Environmental Protection is a federal institution with 13
regional units spread all over the Russian Federation. In Murmansk Oblast the
committee has 13 different departments, each one responsible for different functions. In
total, the Committee employs about 100 people in Murmansk Oblast.
The main task of the Committee is the control and regulation of nuclear and industrial
pollution, but it has also duties connected to forest management. It is responsible for the
conservation of national parks, nature memorials, and unique or cultivated species of
plants and animals.
There are 106 specially protected areas of different kinds and sizes in Murmansk Oblast.
Most of them are very small, but there are three larger forest reserves (zapovedniki).
They are very large and all kinds of human activities are forbidden. There are plans to
establish even more zapovedniki near the Finnish border. Furthermore, the Committee
carries out impact assessments of activities in Group I forests. The Committee is
allowed to stop all activities that are considered to pollute or damage nature. The
decisions are formally taken in Moscow, but the regional court implements the
resolution. The Committee has extensive contacts with foreign institutions, especially
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 Murmansk Regional Administration (1998).  See also, Table 4:1.
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 Interview with representatives from the Murmansk Forest Management in March 1999.
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the UN and Norwegian and Finnish organizations. It seems the Committee has defined
its role to be nature’s advocate in Murmansk Oblast, a position that may conflict with
harvesting interests and the need for income in the region.
The Regional Program “Forests of Murmansk Oblast”
The regional program “Forests of Murmansk Oblast” for 1997–2000 was compiled by
the Murmansk Forest Management to implement the resolution by the Russian
Federation Government “On the Federal Program for the Forests of Russia for 1997–
2000”. The Murmansk Governor Evdokimov adopted the Regional program in May
1998.
The Program provides a total overview of the tasks of forest management in the region
and the costs of carrying them out. The Program has been exclusively produced for
forestry, and it does not involve any arrangements regarding the forest industry. It
contains a description of the present condition of the Forest Fund, forest utilization and
regeneration in the region. There is a chapter devoted to arrangements connected to
forest management, reforestation, sanitary harvests, and protection against pests,
diseases and industrial pollution as well as road construction, forest inventory and
monitoring.
The Murmansk Forest Management, the Ministry of Defence (having its own forest
fund) and the Murmansk Committee on Environmental Protection are appointed as the
executors of the Program.
According to the Program the profitability of Murmansk forestry should start to increase
from 1998. This is far from reality. Financial problems have increased during the last
few years and the share of federal funding is decreasing.20 More money must be found in
the Forest Management’s own budgets. The Program has a very optimistic figure for
increasing the workforce engaged in forest management by 37.3 percent. In practice, the
opposite process has taken place when the Murmansk Forest Management had to
significantly reduce staff. Surprisingly, the Murmansk Forest Management nearly
managed to obtain all the money needed according to the plan for 1998,21 but we believe
that inflation, devaluation and price increases left a lot of tasks undone.
Summary
• The New Forest Code adopted in 1997 was expected to lay the foundation for a
profitable forest sector. Decentralization of management to the regional and local
level was one of the aims.
• The restructuring of the forest management system has affected the Murmansk
Forest Management in terms of employment (staff reduction to one third) and a lack
of economic freedom as federal funding has decreased considerably.
• When the possibility to carry out industrial harvests was taken away from the
leskhozy, they lost their main source of income to fulfil their management tasks.
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 14.85 million rubles out of the planned 15.5 million (investments excluded).
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• As federal support decreased, the leskhozy has more or less become self-financing
via other commercial activities. Forest protection has become a burden for them, as
it does not generate any income.
• How the leskhozy are coping with the new economic situation is dependent upon the
location, closeness to the markets and customers.
• The regional administration does not give priority to the forest sector, neither by
supporting the forest management with the promised money nor with “moral”
support. The region lacks a forest lobby that can push the problems onto the political
agenda.
Table 4:2. Leskhozy in the Murmansk Oblast.
N Leskhoz Lesnichestvo Total area
1000 ha
Forested area
(ha)
1 Pechengskiy leskhoz 929.9 565.8
Nikelskoe lesnichestvo 160.5 78.7
Allorechenskoe lesnichestvo 239.3 125.1
Lottskoe lesnichestvo 530.1 362.0
2 Kolskiy leskhoz 1518.7 911.0
Girvasskoe lesnichestvo 706.5 459.9
Murmashinskoe lesnichestvo 471.9 252.4
Taubolskoe lesnichestvo 363.6 198.9
3 Murmanskiy leskhoz 45.6 29.2
Tulomskoe lesnichestvo 12.8 7.1
Prigorodnoe lesnichestvo 32.8 22.1
4 Monchegorskiy leskhoz 421.4 256.9
Moncheozerskoe lesnichestvo 158.2 100.8
Olenegorskoe lesnichestvo 145.8 105.2
Monchegorskoe lesnichestvo 117.4 50.9
5 Zasheykovskiy leskhoz 681.6 428.1
Kovdorskoe lesnichestvo 243.4 174.8
Enskoe lesnichestvo 314.9 138.3
Zasheykovskoe lesnichestvo 223.3 115.0
6 Kirovskiy leskhoz 682.6 311.4
Kirovskoe lesnichestvo 179.1 50.7
Verkhne-Umbskoe lesnichestvo 254.7 133.2
Apatitskoe lesnichestvo 248.8 127.5
7 Kandalakshskiy leskhoz 938.5 638.0
Alakkurtinskoe lesnichestvo 470.4 326.8
Kandalakshskoe lesnichestvo 245.1 177.0
Kolvitskoe lesnichestvo 223.0 134.2
8 Lovozerskiy leskhoz 1788.4 737.0
Lovozerskoe lesnichestvo 537.8 223.5
Verkhne-Ponoyskoe
lesnichestvo
1250.6 513.5
9 Terskiy leskhoz 2085.0 853.1
Indelskoe lesnichestvo 351.5 181.2
Umbskoe lesnichestvo 248.8 144.1
Varzugskoe lesnichestvo 1484.7 527.8
10 Kovdozerskiy leskhoz 400.7 243.2
Zelenoborskoe lesnichestvo 129.6 70.1
Kovdskoe lesnichestvo 145.8 89.1
Kovdozerskoe lesnichestvo 125.3 84.0
Source: Eikeland et al. (1999).
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5. The Forest and Wood Processing Industry in Transition
Forestry and the forest and wood-processing industry together form the so-called forest
complex in the region. In earlier times, under the planned economy, all harvesting
companies (lespromkhozy) in the region were state owned and united into the territorial
production association Murmanles, which in turn was part of the Russian State forest
industrial company Roslesprom. Activities of these enterprises were centrally planned,
each lespromkhoz was assigned a particular harvesting area and certain purchasers of its
production. Sawmills at the harvesting companies represented the wood-processing
industry in the region. There were also two separate sawmills and a number of wood-
processing companies subordinate to various Ministries.
In this chapter we will take a closer look at what has happened with the forest
companies in the region when they went through the privatization process, how they are
coping with the new property rights and how this has affected their production.
The System of Privatization in Russia
Property is a complex conception. This is true in any economic system due to many
reasons (Reznik, 19968). As far as utilization of natural resources is concerned, property
rights regimes are very important. Effective and sustainable management of natural
resources to a large extent depends upon the allocation of property rights (Bac, 1998).
During the Soviet time, all natural resources were owned by the State. Later a debate on
ownership of natural resources started between Moscow and the regions. The regions
argued that they could better manage the natural resources located on their territory.
Moscow, however, did not want to lose its control over resources. This problem does
not yet seem to be completely solved. Forest resources are still State owned according
to the Forest Code.
All of the enterprises were also state-owned. The privatization process in Russia started
in 1992. In the privatization program there were five groups of businesses for which
different terms of privatization were provided.
Different kinds of property were privatized under different conditions. Objects of
national importance (for instance, natural resources) were not allowed to be privatized.
Privatization of the others needed to be preceded by approvals from authorities of
different levels or to be included into local privatization programs. Finally, privatization
of objects of trade, construction and light industry as well as of unprofitable enterprises
and unfinished construction was obligatory (Sutela, 1993).
The State Property Committee was established as a special administrative body to
organize privatization. Among its functions was the preparation of the State
Privatization Program and other relevant documents, control over its realization, making
decisions on the privatization of State-owned companies, promoting the establishment
of investment funds and holding companies. The Committee had its territorial
subdivisions in regions and big cities. Their functions were similar to those of the
supervising Committee but oriented to the republican and local levels. Another
organization created for participation in the privatization process was the Russian Fund
41
of Federal Property. The Fund and its representatives were the only sellers of State
property. Its republican and regional subdivisions were playing the same role at the
respective levels. The main function of the Fund was temporary possession of property
transferred to it by the State Property Committee.
The privatization of State and municipal companies could be initiated by the State
Property Fund and its territorial subdivisions, leaders and workers of the company as
well as by other companies, bank creditors and authorities.
The Russian Privatization Program was part of the process of transition to a market
economy. However, it differed from other integral parts of the process, which
progressed more slowly. Privatization in Russia was insufficiently considered and very
fast. This process was totally new for the country, which for a long time lived under
absolutely different conditions. No efficient institutional restructuring had been made
before the process started (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1997). On the one hand, the
current situation shows that privatization went the wrong way in many aspects and did
not give the expected outcome. On the other hand, it enabled enterprising people to start
their own business. An analysis of the situation at forest sector companies in Murmansk
Oblast gives both types of examples.
Changing Property Forms in the Murmansk Forest Sector
Following the privatization program, which started in 1992, some lespromkhozy and
wood processing enterprises became joint stock companies (Murmansk Regional
Administration, 1998). Privatization, however, did not necessarily mean that people
working for the enterprises became their real owners. An example of this in Murmansk
Oblast is Kovdorskiy lespromkhoz — one of two harvesting companies still operating in
the region — out of 11 formerly existing state harvesting companies. The enterprise is
actually owned by the Federal Fund of State Property. Workers nominally have some
portion of non-voting shares. Thus, the company is still state-owned.
In 1993, the state government adopted resolutions oriented to improving the situation in
the forest industry, according to which the territorial production association Murmanles
was supposed to become a regionally owned stock company. However, due to financial
reasons these resolutions were not implemented and in 1996 Murmanles was liquidated
and the industry lost its regional management.
Lately, as a result of the production recession and lack of internal working capital, 10 of
the 11 formerly existing state owned harvesting companies (lespromkhozy) became
bankrupt either before or right after privatization. Besides the problems directly
connected to their production, such as old machinery, technology and lack of demand, it
was to a large extent caused by the obligation to keep social responsibilities. Many of
the lespromkhozy were so-called town-forming companies — often the only company in
a settlement that provided jobs, kept housing, health services and childcare. This is why
it is not surprising that when the old structure disintegrated, the necessity to operate
under the new conditions and keep supporting social responsibilities led to bankruptcy.
Closure of enterprises negatively affected employment and the general socioeconomic
conditions in the settlements.
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Our analysis of the interviews that we conducted with 18 companies in the Murmansk
Oblast has shown that all the forest industry enterprises in the region can be divided into
two groups, those that were established in the period 1932–1949 and those established
in 1992–1997.
The explanation here is very simple — the old enterprises emerged when the industry
was developed in the region and then they operated with no change until the transition
to a market economy began. In the second period, new private companies were
established or old ones were reorganized or taken over by new owners.
Privatized enterprises were mostly becoming open joint stock companies while newly
established private companies could have a different legal status. The owners of a newly
established company could choose the legal status themselves.
The companies that we interviewed are distributed according to the following legal
status:
1. Open joint stock companies (OAO). These companies are open with respect to
shareholders. Anyone can buy shares in the company at a price that reflects the
value of the company. There are four in our sample — three former State-owned
companies privatized within the State Privatization Program and one foreign
company.
2. Closed joint stock companies (ZAO). The shares of these companies can not be sold
to outsiders without the consent of the majority of the shareholders. There is one
foreign company, one new private company, one established on the basis of an old
company and one joint venture in this group.
3. Individual private enterprise (IChP). There were three IChP’s in our sample. This
form is popular for small companies because of the simplified taxation system. The
restriction here is that the owner can not hire more than 15 workers. The owner is
responsible for the firm’s liabilities and it usually bears the name of the owner.
4. Company with limited liability (OOO). The members of the "partnership" are
responsible for its liabilities only within the limits of their respective unpaid portion
of authorized capital. As soon as their payments are fulfilled, they are no longer
personally responsible. Shares can have different values, depending upon the
contribution to the authorized capital, and the profit of the company is divided
among the shareholders in accordance with their payment. There are five companies
of this form. They are private companies either totally new or established based on
the production facilities of old bankrupt companies.
5. Municipal unitary companies (MULP). This is an old lespromkhoz bought by the
local authorities after going bankrupt soon after privatization. This is an example of
failed privatization where the market conditions for the survival of the company
were absent. This company is the only MULP in the region. It implies that the
process of establishing municipal unitary companies is not progressing although it
was considered as one of the major ways for restructuring of the industry.
6. The Murmansk Oblast has only one remaining state owned company, it is an old
lespromkhoz, which is bankrupt, still operating, but it has neither been privatized nor
taken over by another company.
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The six leskhozy in the sample should not be seen as companies since they are part of
the federal administrative body that provides the wood processing companies with raw
materials. They are state owned. They are included in the survey to give a complete
picture of forestry in the region, but will not be described in this chapter.
Table 5:1. Legal status of forest companies included in the sample from Murmansk
Oblast.
Legal status Russian abbreviation Number
Open joint stock company OAO 4
Closed joint stock company ZAO 4
Individual private enterprises IChP 3
Private company with limited liability OOO 5
Municipal MULP 1
State GP 1
Federal Forest Service (leskhoz) 6
Total 24
The situation in the industry does not make it possible to identify which of the different
kinds of legal status is the most advantageous. On the one hand, privatization has made
it possible for companies to make decisions themselves. This, in turn, depends upon the
managers’ capability to run the company under the new conditions. The effectiveness of
the enterprise functioning very much depends upon the personality of its leader, his
experience, understanding of the situation, and ability to adapt to new conditions
(Dolgopiatova, 1996).
On the other hand, the breakdown of centrally controlled state-owned enterprises
created new business relationships between suppliers and consumers. Under the old
regime, informal mechanisms emerged in order to help enterprises to obtain the supplies
that they were supposed to get according to the state plan. However, after 1990, the
responsibilities connected to the operation of companies suddenly became a respon-
sibility of company leaders. They were forced to solve problems connected to their
production, such as finding suppliers and consumers themselves, which was not the case
under the planned economy.  However, for many the transition to new conditions was
not successful. One of the main reasons was the lack of skills and knowledge about how
to operate under market conditions (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1997).
In Murmansk, there are both positive and negative examples illustrating this process of
adaptation. Moreover, companies of various ownership forms have many problems in
common, like tax and customs legislation, lack of skilled personnel, out-of-date
machinery, etc. There is a discussion taking place about the establishment of an
organization that would coordinate the industry’s activities at the regional level. In
contrast to other regions having organizations like holding companies or so-called
"Unions of Forest Industrialists", the Murmansk forest industry lacks this kind of
structure. However, not all of the companies express a wish to join such an association
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if it were established. Leaders of some of the companies are skeptical about it, thinking
that it would be just one more bureaucratic body consuming their money.
In 1998, the regional administration elaborated recommendations for maintaining the
industry, which however have not been followed because implementation would have
required considerable investments. As previously stated, the regional authorities do not
pay enough attention to the industry, as it is not a sector of priority, only accounting for
0.4 percent of the regional economy. Contacts between the companies and the Regional
Administration are individual, occurring primarily when a company submits a proposal
for consideration or negotiates about a delay in tax payments. There is not a single
person responsible for the industry development as a whole, although in previous times
there was a special department inside the Regional Administration. In this situation each
company has to find its own way to function.
How to Manage on Their Own22
“Les” Ltd. is a harvesting and processing company. It has two subdivisions based on
production facilities of the former Oktyabrskiy lespromkhoz and Kandalakshskiy lesokom-
binat (a sawmill). The company Murmantopprom, which then founded OOO «Les», has
purchased the production facilities.
Under the planned economy, the industry regularly received subsidies from Moscow. Com-
panies did not have to look for financial sources for investments. The situation changed,
however, production started to decline. Many companies went bankrupt and their assets were
sold to obtain money to pay debts. The best machinery was sold outside the region. At
present, however, new machinery is needed for improved production but "Les" Ltd. has no
financial means for investments. The director negotiated with the regional administration
about the possibility to obtain loans. This is a problem because the company's accounts in the
bank are "blocked" by a resolution of the tax authorities.
The director is certain that in order to work effectively the industry needs a coordinating
structure at the regional level. At present, however, the company can not rely upon any
assistance from the regional (oblast) administration and is seeking possibilities for develop-
ment from outside. There are plans for cooperation with a Swedish company, which is
supposed to organize harvesting with its own machinery and workforce. It will provide the
raw materials to be processed by OOO “Les”. The Swedish company is also supposed to
invest in new processing machinery at OOO “Les”. So far, this cooperation appears to be the
only possibility to develop production.
Obviously, it can be concluded that privatization of the forest industry in the Murmansk
Oblast did not improve the situation in the industry as a whole. However, in spite of the
general decline and great need for investments, there are private companies running
their business quite successfully. But, as we have found, all of them have one thing in
common, namely some kind of partnership with foreign business. Actually they are
either entirely foreign owned companies, joint ventures, or companies exporting their
production. Thus, taking the current situation into account, the creation of favorable
conditions to attract foreign investment for maintaining the industry in the region seems
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 From the interview with the general director of "Les" Ltd.
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to be an important issue to be considered. Support from the Regional Administration in
this respect is so far absent.
Changing Terms of Timber Acquisition
In the Soviet period, the state owned forest industrial companies (lespromkhozy)
dominated in harvesting and trading timber. The Forest Fund was officially owned by
Gosleskhoz, which was later renamed the Federal Forest Service or Rosleskhoz. The
central level constructed the whole production chain. It was not based on market
relations. Each link was assigned a certain supplier and consumer of its production
(Carlsson et al., 1999b).
The Code and the complementary regulations determine the order of forest use. Plots of
the Forest Fund can either be for short-term use as a result of auction or for long-term
use (lease).
Auction23
According to auction regulations plots of the Forest Fund are given for short-term use
(no longer than one year). In Murmansk Oblast auctions started in 1997. Earlier the
lespromkhozy only paid a stumpage fee, which did not exceed 2–3 percent of the selling
price for round timber in the region. The center fixed the selling prices and price lists
were sent to provinces.
At auctions the initial price for a standing forest is determined on the basis of real rates
of payments for standing forest and the current demand for forest resources. Auctions
are arranged by leskhozy at the local level. The only exception was in 1998 when an
auction was arranged at the regional level, organized by the Murmansk Forest
Management. However, conducting auctions at the regional level proved to be less
effective, as it was necessary even for those buying small plots of the forest fund to
attend the auction conducted at the regional center. The leskhozy are also better aware of
those interested to buy in their own districts and can organize an auction when it is
needed. This is the reason why auctions moved back to the local level in 1999. On the
other hand, delegating all the authorities to the leskhozy might give them an incentive to
manipulate the resources for their own benefit.
In order to ensure unbiased auctions, special commissions are established, the
composition of which is approved by the local administration. The deputy head of the
district administration chairs the commission and the commission members are
representatives of the administration's financial department and the leskhoz
administration. As the organizer of an auction, the leskhoz produces a list of forest plots
to be sold. The necessary condition is an announcement in a newspaper about the
forthcoming auction no later than 30 days before the event. It contains all the necessary
information about the auction as well as the deadline for submitting applications from
potential buyers.
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 Jacobsen (1999) has made a study of timber auctions in Murmansk Ob
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The initial price is fixed by the leskhoz. As a rule the price for a standing forest must not
be lower than the assessment made on the basis of a minimal payments rate with
expected expenditures taken into consideration. Normally auction participants have to
pay a deposit, which is not less than 10 percent of the cost of the auctioned forest plot.
Afterwards the deposit is included into the price of a purchased plot or returned to those
who made no purchase.
The person (company) who won an auction and the auction organizer sign a protocol the
same day, which is valid as an agreement. After signing the protocol the buyer has to
pay for the plot within 20 days and then he receives a harvesting license (lesorubochnyi
bilet). Every year the leskhozy in the region organize 3–5 auctions. In total there are
eight such organizers since the Murmansk and Lovozero leskhozy only have forests of
Group I on their territory and these forests could not be sold on auctions (Mal’kova,
1999).
In reality, however, at the local level auctions are in fact more like direct negotiations
with buyers. This is explained by the lack of competition. The demand for forest
resources is higher in the southern part of the region. The reasons for this are the
closeness to the Finnish border (most of the sawn wood is exported), the higher forest
density and the relatively short distance for transportation (40–50 km compared to
almost 200 in the north) and better climatic conditions.
Leasing
According to the Forest Code, plots are leased through resolutions of the Regional
Administration based on a submission from the regional Forest Management or
according to the results of forest tender. The leasing agreement is concluded in written
form and must be registered with the Regional Administration. The Leasing agreement
includes the following terms:
• borders of the forest plot,
• types of forest use,
• volumes (sizes) of forest use,
• leasing terms,
• size of payment and order of instalments,
• responsibilities of the parties concerning the protection and reproduction of the forest
fund, and
• other terms brought about by the forest legislation and determined at the parties’
discretion.
 Plots are given on short-term leases for a period of one to five years. Forest users
operating for a long time in a given area, and possessing adequate production capacities,
have certain privileges when it comes to leasing terms. The Forest Fund owner (leskhoz)
issues a timber license. Leasing terms can be extended to 49 years and may be renewed
(Kopylova, 1999).
 In Murmansk Oblast harvesting areas are mostly leased for 4 years and 11 months with
an annual harvest no higher than 10,000 m3. The reasoning behind this is that leases for
longer than 5 years make leaseholders' work much more complicated with respect to
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planning harvesting and a forest fund inventory are required. There is, however, a
harvesting company “Priroda” which has leased some of the plots for 49 years. The
company has its activity in areas bordering Finland and Norway. The favorable location
of the plots facilitates cooperation with foreign partners. It is a regional peculiarity that
plots located close to the border are more valuable, which eases their selling for the
forest owner and makes it possible for the companies leasing them to make long-term
plans.
 Payment for leasing is agreed upon between the leskhoz and the tenant taking into
account the plot size, annual cut or other kind of forest use as well as the current rate of
payments for forest use. Payment is determined on the basis of the minimum stumpage
fee fixed by the Federal government and can not be lower than this minimal rate.
 Forest Fund plots are leased to users against payment in order to realize one or several
types of forest use. Plots can be leased for the following purposes:
• timber harvesting,
• gum harvesting,
• collection of secondary forest products (stump, bark and  pine and fir branches),
• harvesting of minor forest products, such as hay, pasture, agriculture, and the
collection of mushrooms, berries, lichens and medical plants,
• hunting,
• science and research, and
• recreation and tourism (Kopylova, 1999).
 At present there are 26 Forest Fund plots leased on the region's territory. Only 7 are
used for harvesting timber, while the others are used for pasture as well as for recreation
and tourism.
 In our sample we learned that the companies' preferences are divided between auction
and leases. The choice depends on the plans of the company and characteristics of the
acquired plot.
 How to Choose Terms of Timber Acquisition24
 The "Les" Ltd. company has chosen auction as a way for forest acquisition. The director
considers that leasing is not appropriate. Forests on the territory of Kirovskiy leskhoz have
low density. To be able to harvest the needed annual amount within 5 years one has to take a
vast territory on lease. This means much higher rates of payment for timber as well as the
other costs. This is due to the fact that payments are done for the whole leased area
irrespective of amount harvested. Leasing seems more relevant for richer forest areas where
smaller plots must be leased to provide the needed amount of timber harvested.
 The terms of payment for forests acquired at auctions, however, constitute a problem for the
company. Under the previous system, the stumpage fees were paid by instalments within a
year. Nowadays, the obligation to pay within 20 days is heavy, requiring some initial capital
because revenues from harvesting can not be expected to be received for some time. It would
be easier for the company to pay by instalments.
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 From an interview with the general director of "Les" Ltd.
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The Forest and Wood Processing Industry in Murmansk Oblast
 Decentralization of the decision-making system and disintegration of economic links
have negatively affected the forest complex in the region. We will show by diagrams
how the production output has changed.
Diagram 5:1. Harvesting in Murmansk Oblast in 1992–1998.
 Diagram 5:1 is evidence of the difficult situation in the industry. In 1998, the harvesting
output decreased by about 88 percent compared to figures in 1992. The industry’s share
in total production volume of the region decreased and in 1997 it only accounted for 0.4
percent.
 The production recession has been mainly caused by the use of obsolete machinery and
technologies at the enterprises of the forest industry in the region and, as a consequence,
high cost price increases and lack of demand for the products. The dramatic reduction of
construction activity led to decreased harvesting and heavily affected sawmills and
wood-processing enterprises. At present, harvesting companies have no means for
modernizing their machinery.
 After the Regulations on Forest Leases were adopted and payments for forest use
increased, stumpage fees and timber costs also grew. Market prices for timber are,
however, stable or even decreasing for some products. Such a situation made it difficult
for the enterprises to sell their products and increased the losses of harvesting
companies (Murmansk Regional Administration, 1998). It must be noted, however, that
the share of the stumpage fees in the price for roundwood does not exceed 10 percent.
 On 1 April 1999, the Federal government approved a wage increase for people working
in the so-called budget sphere, which means the organizations were financed by sources
of various administrations. As a consequence, all kinds of payments also increased. This
has affected the wage level in leskhozy and has, in turn, had an effect on the price for
saw logs, which the leskhozy sell to processing companies. This has negatively
influenced the enterprises’ economic performance and brought some of them to the edge
of survival.
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 Table 5:2. Number of companies and employment in the forest and wood-processing
industry in Murmansk Oblast in 1992–1997.
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Number of companies 106 96 95 116 82 52
Employment 5931 4553 3661 3141 1969 1568
 Source: Murmansk Regional Administration (1998).
 Table 5:2 shows that the total number of companies in the forest and wood-processing
industry decreased by 50 percent in the period from 1992 to 1997. However, there was
an increase in the number of companies in 1995. This was the period of privatization
and many people tried to start their own businesses. However, many of them were not
prepared for this new activity or were not oriented to a long-term activity. The majority
of these new companies were trading companies that had nothing to do with production.
The continuously decreasing total number of staff confirms this. Although there are no
exact figures for 1998, it can be assumed that both the number of companies and the
total number of staff continued to decrease in 1998.
 The changes have affected the variety of products processed in the region. The
enterprises used to produce sawn-wood, chips, boxes and furniture. In the last few
years, however, the output of some products has ceased. The main problem of the
industry is the lack of demand. Processing companies simply have no financial means to
purchase enough raw materials. Table 5:3 shows how production has changed. It is
obviously dependent on the conditions in industries consuming certain kinds of
products. The crisis in the fish processing industry, for instance, resulted in the
reduction or total cessation of tar production. The same has happened with chips for the
pulp and paper industry.
 Table 5:3. Manufacturing of various products in the wood-processing industry in
Murmansk Oblast in 1992–1997.
1975 1985 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Sawn-wood, (million m3) 6.46 4.52 3.54 2.31 1.36 0.50 0.47 0.28 0.29
Chips, (million m3) 0.68 0.81 0.79 0.43 0.12 0.02 - - -
Cardboard boxes,
(million m2) n.a. n.a. n.a. 19.4 17.2 10.7 11.7 10.6 9.1
Barrels, (100 kilo) n.a. n.a. n.a. 143.2 18.6 1.6 1.0 - -
Construction parts,
(million m2) n.a. 3.02 3.10 2.47 1.98 0.94 0.54 0.26 0.28
 Source: Goksomstat Murmansk (1998a); Malkova and Peshev (1997).
 According to recently published statistics, timber removal decreased by 23 percent in
January–February 1999 compared to the respective period for the previous year and the
production of sawn-wood increased by 40 percent (Murmanskii Vestnik, 1999). The
increase in sawn-wood production can be explained by the growing demand for these
products. In spite of the harvesting decline, it was possible to increase production due to
timber availability in storage.
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 Before transition, timber was exported both to other regions and abroad according to
decisions made in Moscow. When this system discontinued there was a decrease in
exports from 1992 to 1994, which then changed into a rapid increase. The reason behind
this is the newly emerged private companies oriented towards export.
 Table 5:4. Timber exports from Murmansk Oblast in 1992–1996.
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Timber exports, (million m3) 0.51 0.45 0.17 0.72 0.97
 Source: Murmansk Regional Administration (1998).
Summary
 The conditions of the Murmansk forest industry can be summarized as follows:
• The deep economic crisis in the forest industry has been mainly caused by a lack of
demand for the products.
• Privatization did not improve the situation for the old state enterprises, but made it
possible for new companies to enter the market.
• There is some competition among companies for acquiring plots located in the south-
western part of the region, which are more attractive for potential buyers. The price
is agreed upon between the leskhoz and the forest users.
• Both forms of plot acquisition — leasing and auctions — are used in the region. In
most cases the lease term does not exceed 4 years 11 months due to bureaucratic
reasons.
• The forest industry decreased dramatically between 1992 and 1998 and experienced
a great need for investment.
• Cooperation with foreign businesses has proven to be a realistic way for maintaining
the industry in the region.
6. Business Behavior
This chapter is based on an analysis of the information collected from 24 enterprises in
the Murmansk Oblast in March–May 1999. As shown in chapter 5, the number of forest
companies in the region is limited and has decreased considerably during the last 10
years. This selection of companies actually includes between 80 and 90 percent of all
forest enterprises in the region today thereby enabling us to draw conclusions about the
sector as a whole. Six of the ten existing leskhozy are in our sample, two pure harvesting
companies (former lespromkhozy), as well as nine combined sawmill/processing and
seven combined harvest/sawmill companies.
Information from the companies will be compared with similar data collected from
enterprises in the Arkhangelsk Oblast and the Karelian Republic, the neighboring
regions of Murmansk in the north of Russia. In spite of the geographical closeness,
these regions are different in terms of the importance of the forest sector for the regional
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economy. Karelia and Arkhangelsk are some of the most important regions for timber
harvesting, processing and pulp and paper production in Russia. Murmansk Oblast has
never been and will never be a forestry region of that size. Nevertheless, we will try to
find out if the institutional setting for business behavior in the forest sector is similar in
the Russian regions or if large differences between various regions exist.
Altogether, the database contains 245 interviews with forest companies all over Russia
and Northern Sweden. In some cases the regions in the Russian North will be compared
with the rest of Russia, which represent companies in Siberia (Tomsk, Krasnoyarsk
Irkutsk, Khabarovsk,) and central Russia (Moscow Oblast).
This chapter will select different “themes” or “indicators” to allow a discussion of the
companies’ degree of adaptation to a market system and how successful they have been.
We will try to evaluate some of the results both for the companies and the forestry
societies in Murmansk Oblast.
Production
The forest industry in Murmansk Oblast has traditionally been highly subsidized by the
central level. The production was mainly consumed in the local and regional markets by
providing the wood processing industries with products demanded. Companies were
relatively small and the local market limited. One could believe that a transformation to
the market economy would be particularly difficult in this region and affect the amount
of production. This was certainly the case. According to official statistics, timber
harvests have dropped from 690,000 m3 in 1992 to 97,000 m3 in 1998. But has this
actually resulted in changes in the main production of the companies? We asked the
enterprises in our sample about the production today, one year ago, five years ago and
ten years ago.
Table 6:1. Changes in main production in 24 selected enterprises in Murmansk Oblast.
Percentage of the total number of companies in the sample.
1989 1994 1998 1999
Roundwood 8.3 12.5 25.0 25.0
Sawn wood 8.3 8.3 29.2 33.3
Processing 4.2 8.3 12.5 12.5
Roundwood/sawn wood 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2
Forest management 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
Did not exist 50.0 41.7 4.1
Those companies, which have prevailed over time, do not seem to have changed their
main production much. They are still inside the main categories. However, it is obvious
from the interviews that many companies used to have a larger variety of products, but
have had to reduce the selection as the total output dropped. We also know that earlier
there were companies making furniture, packaging and cardboard boxes. This
production has now completely disappeared. It is difficult to say whether this is a
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development for the better or worse. On the one hand, we can say that the demand for
the product has dropped or completely disappeared and the production decrease/stop is
just a normal market reaction. On the other hand, there can still be a demand for the
type of products, but as long as the producer has not been able to change the production
according to new requirements, the customer must look for new producers in other
places in Russia or abroad.
One example from the interviews is a processing company that buys logs from the
Leningrad and Arkhangelsk regions because there is not a company in Murmansk
Oblast that can deliver the right dimension and quality of logs. The sawmills in
Murmansk Oblast still operate with the old standard dimensions, while the market
demands different dimensions.
Nevertheless, we also find examples of firms in our sample that have adapted to the new
market. Furniture, kitchen complexes, windows and doors are manufactured on demand.
This is not any mass production but individual fabrication for the newly rich Russians.
Workforce
The smallest enterprise in our sample has 5 employees and the largest 319. The average
number of workers is 38, with 9 white collars or administrative personnel. This number
is very low compared to Northwestern and other Russian regions. 85 percent of the
companies in Murmansk Oblast is in the category “small” (with up to 100 employees)
while the remaining 15 percent are medium sized (101–500). Both Arkhangelsk Oblast
and the Karelian Republic have several companies with more than 500 employees and
their size also outnumbers the companies from other Russian regions in the total sample.
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Diagram 6:1. Size of enterprise/number of employees in forest companies in selected
regions.
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Diagram 6:1 gives us an idea of the minor role this branch plays in Murmansk Oblast
and how small each unit is. The size logically has consequences for the possibility for
these companies to survive in an economically difficult period.25
Social Responsibilities
In previous chapters, we have described how the system of integrated town building
companies gave the forest enterprises a big responsibility for the whole community with
providing social services like housing, food supply, kindergartens, schools, etc. It will
not be possible to keep all these obligations when the companies transform to a market
system. The social tasks should be transferred to the municipalities,26 and the companies
should concentrate on their business activity and make production profitable. One way
of looking at the companies’ ability to adapt to the market system is to ask if they have
been freed of these tasks. More than 40 percent of the Murmansk companies still
contribute with some social services, but very few of them do this on a regular basis.
Examples of contributions are the distribution of food in connection to holidays and
sponsoring sports and cultural activities. 17 percent of the companies still have housing
responsibilities for their employees. In any case, Murmansk is the region in our study
that has the lowest amount of social responsibilities. In Karelian firms, 55 percent have
such obligations and in the rest of the Russian regions in the study the corresponding
share is 50 percent.
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Diagram 6.2. Social responsibilities among companies in selected regions.
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 We would have preferred to have done some calculations that illustrate the changes in workforce in
relation to changes in production. This would also have been interesting in light of productivity
development. However, due to the fact that there were many new companies in our selection we
unfortunately lack data that can be used to illustrate changes over time. The numbers of valid cases are
too small for any statistical analyses.
26
 Unfortunately, the municipal administration in many Russian regions is short of funds and has
problems in providing citizens with basic social services.
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If we try to look for reasons for the lower degree of social responsibilities among the
companies in Murmansk Oblast, one possible explanation will be their small size.
Although many villages have been developed around the enterprises, they have not been
as important for thousands of people as the vast integrated companies in Karelia and
Arkhangelsk. The consequences of not providing services for a society with a big
company with many employees are naturally bigger than in a small village. Another
reason is undoubtedly the fact that we have so many new companies in our sample. The
older, but now privatized companies are more reluctant to carry with them the
responsibility they used to have during Soviet times.
Verkhnetulomskii — A Forest Village of Hope?27
The village of Verkhnetulomskii is situated 60 kilometers west of the regional center
Murmansk. The area is sparsely populated and far from other settlements along the river
Tuloma. The only means of transport is by a rather bad road going to Murmansk in one
direction and to the Finnish border in the other direction. The village has about 3,000
inhabitants, of which 1,100 constitute the working force. Harvesting and wood processing is
the main and almost only activity going on in the village except for a kolkhoz with some
farming activities. The village also has some reindeer breeders belonging to the Saami
indigenous population.
Verkhnetolumskii lespromkhoz was established in 1932 and has been the “village developer”
for almost 60 years. The lespromkhoz was the most successful in the whole region with the
highest production of timber and logs. In 1988, they produced 267,000 m3 timber and had
more than 600 employees. The lespromkhoz had the responsibility for the well-being of the
inhabitants, providing them with jobs, housing, heating, electricity, etc. The problems started
in the early 1990s when the old ties of integrated companies were brought to an end and they
had to adapt to a new market system. Old customers disappeared and they could not profitably
sell their products. The adverse economic conditions largely depending on debt for providing
the employees and the village with social services made it unattractive for private investors,
and it was not privatized when most of the other lespromkhozy started this process in 1995.
The lespromkhoz was allowed to continue as a state company but soon became insolvent and
was set under “external administration”. The main task for the new director was to get rid of
all the social responsibilities. The municipal administration in Kola was not so enthusiastic to
take over the expenses, but it finally agreed to do so in late 1996. Although many hoped for a
new start, the debt only increased and the company was officially declared bankrupt in 1997.
The lespromkhos was forced to sell machinery at any price to satisfy the creditors and was left
with only one production line. One would expect the story of the lespromkhoz to end here, but
surprisingly, it is still functioning, producing a small amount of timber and logs. The number
of employees (today 100) is far higher than required but are kept in the company so as not to
cause unemployment. Salaries are paid irregularly and mostly given in the form of food
products. How could this continue when the company was definitely bankrupt? It was actually
a decision made by the regional administration in 1998 that two of the lespromkhozy in the
region (Verkhnetulomskii and Kovdorskii) should be kept as state companies because they
were too important for the survival of the villages.
Another harvesting enterprise was established in the 1960s under the name Verkhnetulomskii
Wood Processing Factory, a subdivision of the state energy agency Murmantopprom. Its main
task was to provide the population and organizations with firewood. In 1992, the enterprise
was transformed into a closed joint stock company called Priroda. The employees took over
the company, with 5–6 persons as the main shareholders. The company is involved in both
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 The information in this box is based on: a) Zychovskaia (1997), b) Norwegian Energy Efficiency Group
(1998), and c) Interviews with companies Verkhnetulomskii lespromkhoz, Priroda, and NORU Priroda.
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harvesting and processing and is actually the company in Murmansk Oblast with the biggest
production, and one of the few that has increased production during the 1990s. It gives work
to 115 employees and has gradually been equipped with new western technology. Investments
have recently been made (from profits) in new equipment.
In 1995, the main shareholders and Director Dvoriankin in Priroda started together with
Norwegian interests (the company Norsk Hydro) the joint venture NORU Priroda. The plant
was built from scratch with western modern technology and gives work to approximately 50
people. It has a Norwegian director and produces logs for export. The aim of this
establishment was to secure the harvesting company Priroda with a stable purchaser for their
timber. At the same time, the processing company NORU Priroda was granted the stable
delivery of raw materials for its production. These two “integrated” companies form a perfect
constellation that reduces the risks of external uncertainty in the market for both of them.
Some 70 percent of the production of Priroda goes to NORU Priroda, the rest is exported to
Finland. NORU Priroda exports 99 percent of its sawn wood production through its
Norwegian partner Norsk Hydro. The sawn wood is transported by road to Norway and sold to
the western market. Both companies provide their workers with a good and stable salary and
can, from time to time, provide money for sponsoring local sports teams and pensioners of the
village. Nevertheless, they are both dependent on the demand for logs from the western market
and the fact that the Norwegian partner can find customers. The story of the successful
adaptation to the new market conditions and the willingness to invest money in the companies
is unfortunately more an exception than a rule in the forest sector of Murmansk Oblast. In this
case, much has happened because of the ability of Director Dvoriankin to think in an
innovative way and find the right contacts. The lespromkhoz never managed to get onto the
right track and was stuck in the old system and thinking.
An expenditure that has heavily burdened the municipal budget is the mazut fuel oil used for
producing electricity and heating for the village. The mazut is expensive in itself and
transportation costs are huge, as it must be transported from the south to Murmansk on rail and
to Verkhnetulomskii by truck. NORU Priroda produces sawdust, bark and wood chips, but
made no use of it and deposited the waste in a landfill. The idea of utilizing waste from the
sawmill has developed through the Norwegian partner and their contacts in Norway. It became
evident that the sawmill produces enough waste to substitute almost all of the fuel oil used in
the district heating plant. Wood waste will substitute 3,200 tons a year of fuel oil and save
considerable amounts of money in the municipal budget. In addition, there will be a
substantial environmental effect. The contract was signed in the autumn of 1998 and
construction has started partly financed by Norwegian Governmental funds. The district
heating company TEKOS will run the plant.
The number of employees in the forest sector in the village has not reached the peak level of
the lespromkhoz. Nevertheless, the prosperity of the Priroda-duo has created new optimism in
the village and hopes for a future solution of the destiny of the lespromkhoz.
Investments in the Company
An important indication of a sound economy and possibilities to expand in the market
can be perceived in an enterprise’s willingness and ability to invest in the company.
Most companies in the Murmansk forest sector are left with old machinery and many
had to sell their best equipment when they went bankrupt after the privatization process.
Only 42 percent of the companies in our sample from Murmansk Oblast make their own
investments. Those who invest, do so in equipment and machinery. Only one company
has invested in buildings. This is not a very optimistic picture but the situation is not
more positive in other northern Russian regions either (Diagram 6:3).
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Diagram 6:3. Investments in forest companies in selected regions.
Lack of capital for investments appear to be a general problem in all regions but are
particularly evident in Arkhangelsk Oblast, where only 23 percent of the companies put
money into the company. Investments are needed to restructure the companies, but the
reason for not doing so can be found in the macroeconomic system as pointed out by
Ickes et al. (1997:106).
Economic recovery requires that enterprises invest in such growth-oriented
opportunities as restructuring and entry into new activities. The problem is that
uncertainty over the durability of financial stabilization and other macroeconomic
conditions in Russia might cause investors to postpone such activity until some of
this uncertainty is resolved.
One can elaborate on different reasons for not making investments. First, we can take a
look at the owners. What kind of incentives do they have to make investments? Are they
really interested in developing the company, or are they only oriented to a survival
strategy? The forest branch is certainly a sector where it takes time to see the results of
investments. It is definitely not a place where the investor can take out the profit in a
short time. Harvesting companies are probably the ones who can rapidly sell the timber
and make money. The margins are small, however, and there is a need for up-to-date
harvesting machines to do the job quickly and efficiently. Customers are also now more
demanding, as quality is essential. With a good sales agreement, preferably for export, it
is however possible to make some profits. Sawmills and processing companies need to
invest in equipment, producing facilities and competence to be able to compete on the
market.
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Bank Relations in Connection to Investments
Ten enterprises in our sample have made investments in their own company. Only one
company financed the investments from bank loans, one with loans from other sources
and one with a combination of bank loans and company money. Six companies had
used their own money (either from the owner or their own profit) to invest in the
venture. This picture demonstrates that bank relations are poor and there is virtually no
chance for a company to obtain the needed credit through a normal bank loan. Credits
are too expensive and the companies can not afford the normal bank loan terms. One
might say that trust is absent in both banks and forest companies. This is not solely a
problem for forest enterprises. Commander and Mumssen (1998:7) state that bank loans
to the private sector in general only accounted for 10 percent of the GDP in the first half
of 1998. For the time being banks are more interested in financing the government.
Six of our companies emphasize the high interest rate as the reason for not financing
investments by bank loans. Two companies do not require loans, while five emphasize
the lack of security to obtain loans. They simply do not have the needed working capital
or assets that can be used as security. Six companies (25%) had the needed money (3
harvesting, 2 processing, 1 leskhoz) and were willing to use this for investments. This is,
nevertheless, a positive feature that demonstrates that at least some companies believe
in the future and can find the necessary money to improve their future situation. In
western companies it is common that internal funds are used for investments. Among
the Swedish companies in our sample, more than 70 percent had their own funds. The
Russian average is about 25 percent, so enterprises in Murmansk Oblast are more
typical in this sense. In neighboring Arkhangelsk Oblast (6.5%) and Republic of Karelia
(13.9%) we find a more constrained willingness to use their own funds. One reason for
this difference could be the smaller size of the companies in Murmansk. Firms in
Murmansk Oblast do not require such large sums for investments in order to make
significant changes, as do the larger companies in the neighboring regions.
Timber Supply
In earlier times, before the abortion of the integrated company- and planning system, all
harvesting companies (lespromkhozy) had their own resource base, a defined amount of
land they could subtract from the state forest fund. Today, about 75 percent of the
companies get their timber directly from the state forests managed by the leskhozy.28
Those who are supplied from other public or private companies are naturally the
sawmill/processing companies which buy an already processed product (logged or sawn
timber). Most of the companies get a high share of their supply from one single
supplier. It is actually only one company that has less than 50 percent from one supplier
(this is a processing company with its suppliers outside the region because of its need
for high quality and differentiated input).
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 See chapter 5 for different terms of acquisition.
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Table 6.2.  Share of timber from the largest supplier (last year).
Share (percent of total demand) Frequency
Less than 50 1
50 to 79 4
80–95 6
96–100 4
Total* 15
*Leskhozy have been omitted, 3 missing cases.
Nearly one third of the companies in the selection buy from 96 to 100 percent of their
timber from one supplier. This is a very high number illustrating that most companies
are “faithful” to their supplier, often the nearby leskhoz in their own area. It does not
appear that many search for different suppliers in order to get a lower price. As the
number of suppliers is limited, they do not have a large selection anyway. It seems that
market mechanisms are not well developed here, competition for forest plots is not
strong. Another reason could be that the transaction costs of choosing a more distant
supplier are too high.
This picture is somewhat different in the neighboring region Karelia where the firms to
a larger extent must rely on several providers to get enough timber. As felling and
production are much larger than in Murmansk, the market mechanism might be more
developed. The units are also much larger, making stable deliverance of bigger amounts
more important.
Leskhozy have been omitted.
Diagram 6.4. Timber supply in selected regions.
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Sixty-five percent of the companies in Murmansk Oblast experience a shortage in
timber supply. This is actually a problem for most companies in all the northern regions.
The picture is quite different in the rest of Russia where less than 30 percent of the
companies in our sample state that they have a shortage of timber. One reason could be
that the resources are scarcer in the north, while central and eastern Russian companies
actually have more providers or more easily accessible resources. Another explanation
could be that the northern regions have a high amount of export as they are nearer to
foreign markets. As some companies find timber exports more profitable than selling on
the domestic market, the remaining companies easily feel that their resources are being
taken away from them.
It is anyway strange that 65 percent of the Murmansk companies can not get enough
timber as only 26 percent of the annual allowable cut in the region are harvested (1996).
If there is a shortage on the market, why do the harvesting companies not log more? The
apparent lack of timber seems to be artificial, since the shortage does not appear as a
demand to the main suppliers.
We asked the enterprise representatives to explain the reason for the shortage of timber.
They mentioned financial reasons combined with technology and competition as the
most important explanation. One could expect transport to be a reason in such a remote
region but this was only mentioned by one enterprise.
It seems that many companies have problems in affording to buy the timber that is
provided on the market. Lack of financial resources prevents them from operating
important links in their production process — the raw material supply. One can also
question if the provider expects too high a price for the timber, possibly combined with
low quality. It is obvious that the market mechanisms do not work and prices are
artificially calculated. Eight companies would not have problems to find alternative
suppliers, while 11 had no alternative supplier. They have no possibility of finding other
providers due to the lack of money or competence.
Terms of Acquisition, Payment and Contracts
Today, harvesting companies29 in Murmansk Oblast have two ways of acquiring timber:
through auction and leasing (see chapter 5 for an explanation of the terms). Among the
harvesting companies in our sample, leasing is mostly used. Seven companies lease
plots, while five use auctions. Auction contracts are for one year, while the leasing
contract can be short-term (from 1 to 5 years) or long-term (from 1 to 49 years). There
is only one forest company in the region that has signed a long-term leasing contract for
49 years.
The following terms of payment are connected to the two forms of timber acquisition:
through auctions where the whole sum is paid within 20 days after signing the contract,
and through leasing where the customer pays quarterly during the whole leasing period.
Most processing companies acquire an already ready-made product from harvesting
companies or sawmills. Inputs into the processing company can be acquired on different
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 The leskhozy are not taken into account.
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terms depending on the contract. Most processing companies used to make the contracts
directly with the director of the supplier company. Few mention the length of the
contract as this probably changes from provider to provider. Three companies report
that they must pay on delivery, two in advance. Two companies make part of their
payments by barter or offset contracts as they lack working capital (see the following
box).
All companies except one use written contracts. This is perhaps not so surprising, as the
terms of timber acquisition require written contracts for both leases and auctions. The
only company using oral agreements is a processing company.
The companies were asked how they arrange their buying payments. All companies
except three make their main payments through the bank. There are two companies that
mainly pay cash directly to their suppliers; they are both processing companies. One
company has an offset arrangement. Barter or other non-monetary forms of payment are
not common for buying arrangements in the Murmansk region. There seems to be a
fairly transparent and open system of payment.
Non-Monetary Arrangements
Although the use of non-monetary payments is minimal for buying agreements among
the forest companies in Murmansk Oblast, some general explanations of the different
forms are needed. This will be exemplified by illustrating one case in the region. We
will observe later in this chapter that non-monetary payments are more common in
selling arrangements.
The period of transition and the lack of money have increased the use of non-monetary
payments for goods, services, taxes and other things. All this is often simply called
barter, but it actually contains other forms of non-monetary or quasi-monetary
arrangements. According to Aukutsionek (1998) the use of barter in Russian industry
rose from a 6 percent share of all sales in 1992 to 41 percent in the first half of 1997 and
is continuing to increase. According to Commander and Mumssen (1998) the non-
monetary transactions can be divided into four groups:
• barter where the transaction involves goods for goods,
• money surrogates primarily with commodity or financial veksels which are
promissory notes issued by enterprises, banks or governments with specified
maturity and discount rates,
• offsets or zachety where the dominant transaction involves debt for goods, and
• debt swaps, sales and roll-overs.
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How to Buy Timber Without Money
“Arcticdrev” is a wood processing company situated in Zelenoborsk in the south of Murmansk
Oblast near the Karelian border. It used to be an integrated part of the Ministry of Construction
(derevoobrabatyvaushchii zavod), but was privatized in 1994. The company produces sawn
wood and different kinds of building materials mainly for the “Severonikel Combine” in
Monchegorsk.
“Arcticdrev” has kept its old suppliers of wood that are mainly situated in Northern Karelia.
For the time being, “Arcticdrev” has no working capital (due to the lack of cash payment from
the main customer “Severonikel”) and can not pay the Karelian suppliers for the timber. The
Karelian lespromkhozy are interested in keeping the business going and are themselves in debt
to the railways and energy suppliers. “Arcticdrev” has settled a zachet or offset agreement
where the Karelian companies’ debts are exchanged for goods to the creditors, the railways and
energy companies. This creates a triangle of transactions between the actors involved.30 The
Karelian lespromkhozy deliver timber to “Arcticdrev” that does not have money to pay.
Instead, it delivers part of its production (sawn wood and building materials) to the railway
company and energy supplier to which the Karelian lespromkhozy are already in debt. By
doing this, the lespromkhozy rid themselves of their debts to the railway company and energy
supplier.
Timber
Debt claims Sawn wood,
building material
This arrangement solves the acute lack of money problem for “Arcticdrev”. Bank loans are not
available or too expensive. Other solutions must be found, otherwise, the company must close
down production and 160 people become unemployed. The zachet agreement seems to be a
good temporary option, but is not something that can be said to enforce market reforms.
Transaction costs are usually higher than in an ordinary money transaction agreement and the
procedure also limits the company’s freedom to invest, for instance, in new machinery or
equipment or restructuring its production process. Simultaneously, the arrangement also has
some “positive” effects for the companies involved, as the lack of cash transferred through
bank accounts can “save” the company from taxation. The tax authorities and ultimately the
Russian budget and citizens are the losers of the game.
Even so, the company is not pleased with the current situation. In the next box we will
illustrate the origin of the state of affairs: the customers inability to pay for the products from
“Arcticdrev”.
Karelian
lespromkhozy Arcticdrev
Railway
Energy suppliers
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Violation of Buying Agreements
Company representatives were asked what would happen if one of the parties breaks the
buying agreement. The general answer is that little happens. If the violation is small,
they usually talk it over and reach some agreement. This discussion could be about the
quality of the timber, volume or price. If the violation is substantial, they can take the
company to the arbitration court (none has done it so far) or change to another supplier.
Some also complain about the regularity of supplies, as deliveries are often late. This
forces the companies to store timber for longer periods in order to avoid supply
problems.
Ten of the companies in our sample have experienced problems31 with its buying
agreements. Of course they first mention the problems with the supplier, but some also
admit that they as buyers are the ones who break the agreement by not paying on time.
Seven companies have not experienced or do not consider violations of buying
agreements as a problem. If we compare the figures from Murmansk Oblast with
Arkhangelsk Oblast and the Republic of Karelia, it seems that the problem of broken
buying arrangements is bigger in Murmansk. However, it is a much bigger problem for
companies in our sample from the rest of Russia, where nearly 60 percent have big
problems.
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Diagram 6.5. Problem of broken buying agreements in some regions.32
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 Unfortunately, we do not have any information on how the railways and energy companies use the
goods that they acquire from “Arcticdrev”. Some might be used in their own production, while others
could be part of a resale or serve as input in a new barter arrangement.
31
 Six regard the violation as a big problem, four as a small problem. Leskhozy are not taken into account.
32
 Companies with no answer are excluded from the calculation.
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Customers/Markets
Half of the enterprises in Murmansk sell their entire production to other companies. One
third sell to both companies and private persons, while only two sell solely to private
persons. Sales to authorities is only mentioned by 2 companies and then in combination
with other customers.
Table 6:3. Main customers for forest products in Murmansk Oblast.
Customer Frequency Percentage
Private persons 2 8.3
Companies 12 50.0
Private/companies 8 33.3
Private/authorities 1 4.2
Companies/authorities 1 4.2
Total 24 100
Where are the main home markets for the forest companies in Murmansk? Not
surprisingly, 87 percent of the companies sell their entire output on the regional market.
As production has decreased and transport tariffs have increased much of the cross-
regional sales have stopped. There are only two companies that still sell to Karelian
processing companies and one window producing company that has its main markets in
Moscow and St. Petersburg. There is little reason to believe that companies in
Murmansk could compete with centrally situated companies on prices and quality.
However, there is expectation for development in the export market. Here, Murmansk
Oblast has an important advantage: its nearness to the Scandinavian markets with a
common border to Finland and Norway.
Exports
Fifty percent of the Murmansk companies in our sample have some kind of exports.33
This figure is slightly higher than in Arkhangelsk while the Karelian companies in the
selection have the highest amount of exports with nearly 60 percent of the companies.
The number of exporting companies from other parts of Russia is lower (less than 40%)
than in the North. The regional differences are quite large with the Far Eastern
Khabarovsk region as the one with the most exports and the Siberian Krasnoyarsk as the
one with least.
The numbers in Diagram 6:6 might not impress given the fact that Murmansk Oblast is
close to foreign borders, but if we look closer at the companies we find that some of
them have rather high export volumes. It should not be forgotten that those who export
are among the companies with the highest output. For 3 enterprises, the export share of
production is from 20 to 40 percent and for the remaining 4 from 80 to 100 percent.
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 This figure must not be confused with the actual number of exported volumes. It only concerns the
number of companies in our selection with export without taking export volumes into account.
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There are still two more companies that export but they have not stated their export
shares.
Exporting products
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Diagram 6:6. Export of products in some regions.34
If we go into the interviews and check what the Murmansk companies really export, we
discover some interesting facts. We hardly find any exports of roundwood, but mostly
sawn wood and processed products as windows and pallets. This is somewhat
surprising, as exports of raw materials are common for an economy in transition. If we
compare this with the export in Karelia, the situation is quite different.35 Most of the
export consists of roundwood and this causes a big problem for the domestic sawmill
and processing companies in Karelia as timber is scarce and they lack raw materials for
production. This has lead to criticism of the western companies that “steal” their
resources in an old colonist way. The companies in Murmansk have somehow managed
to keep more of the processing in their own region. This is positive for the forest
industry as it gives work to more people and creates more value in the region.
In chapter 5, we saw from official statistics that export volumes in the Murmansk forest
sector have grown rapidly since 1994. As general production is decreasing, export
constitutes a larger share of the total output. We can conclude that export is already
important for many companies and can, if it develops in the right direction with the
export of mainly processed products, add important values to the development of the
industry in Murmansk.
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 Leskhozy have been excluded from the calculations.
35
 See Pipponen (1999).
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Arrangement of Selling Agreement, Contract and Payment
Among our Murmansk forest companies, written selling contracts dominate. Only one
enterprise reports the use of oral agreements. As companies have different customers,
their form of payment varies from agreement to agreement. Half of the companies only
have one type of payment arrangement. Seven have cash on delivery and five have cash
before delivery. Cash on delivery is most common for those who sell to private persons,
for instance leskhozy selling firewood to the local population or processing firms selling
building materials and furniture. Cash before delivery is used when the company does
not trust the customer to be worthy of credit. In comparison, our survey illustrates that
most Swedish companies accept payment after delivery. This is common in most
western countries, but is seldom used in Russia. Only one company in our Murmansk
sample must accept payment after delivery from a western customer.
Table 6:4. Arrangement of selling payments
Payment Frequency Percent
Cash on delivery 7 29.2
Cash before delivery 5 20.8
Cash before delivery and on delivery 5 20.8
Cash on delivery, before and non-monetary payment 3 12.5
Cash on delivery and non-monetary payment 3 12.5
No sales 1 4.2
Total 24 100
Three companies accept both cash before and on delivery, while three more in addition
allow non-monetary payment. No company has non-monetary payment as the only form
of arrangement. Such an arrangement is used only in combination with cash on and
before delivery. Six companies (25%) have partly non-monetary payments. Two
companies use veksels (promissory notes of later payments) and four use barter (goods
for goods).36
Fifty-five percent is perhaps not so much and other studies indicate that the barter
economy is much higher in other branches in the region, particularly in the mining and
non-ferrous industry. One reason for the relatively low degree of non-monetary
payments in the forest sector in our sample could be that half of the companies are new
(founded during the last 5 years) without old customer ties. They are usually more
dependent on cash and will not accept anything else. Older companies that keep their
old relations from the Soviet period are more inclined to accept whatever payment they
can get. Many do not have the resources and technology to search for new customers.
Most of the barter and veksel agreements in our sample are connected to one of the big
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 These figures must be handled with some caution, as we have not explicitly asked if the companies use
non-monetary arrangements. The information appeared in connection with cash payments and non-
monetary arrangements could be more common than the numbers indicate.
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industrial combines in the region that already has most of its trade in the barter
economy.
The frequency of non-monetary payments varies in the northern regions. As much as
two-thirds of the Karelian firms in the study have, to some extent, used non-monetary
arrangements for selling their products. In Arkhangelsk this share is 13 percent. How
can we explain these differences? First of all, why is the difference between
Arkhangelsk and Karelia that big? These regions have a very similar company structure
with large units, particularly in the pulp and paper industry and they both have an
important export. One would think that a high amount of export would promote a cash
economy as foreign companies pay in cash, but we have seen that Karelia has the
highest share of exporting companies (60% have some export) but the region is still
leading in non-monetary payments. One possible explanation could be that barter
agreements also exist in the export trade. According to the interviews made in Karelia,
some of the companies receive machinery and equipment as payment for exported
timber.37
The rest of the Russian companies in the study (from Central Russia, West Siberia and
the Far East) have a rather high share of non-monetary selling arrangements (47 percent
of the companies in the sample have some kind of non-monetary selling arrangements).
This figure corresponds with other studies made of the barter economy in Russia as a
whole. According to Aukutsionek (1998), 46 percent of all the timber, wood processing,
pulp and paper companies in Russia were engaged in the barter economy in the first half
of 1997. The number has increased since 1995 and this sector employs a middle
position among other industries. We should be aware that we have only asked about the
use of non-monetary payments in relation to buying and selling products. There are
other payments in the companies that can be non-monetary without involving any
physical goods. One example could be agreements between the local administration and
the company for tax exemptions if companies keep some of their social responsibilities
(exchange of debt for service).
The formalities around selling contracts are almost the same as with buying contracts.
Every company (except one using oral agreements) has written selling contracts. Two
companies did not answer. The transparency should therefore be rather high and
violations easily detected.
Payments for sold products are mainly made through bank transfers to the company’s
account. Nearly 60 percent of the Murmansk companies in our survey receive all their
payments via a bank. Several receive cash from some customers and bank payments
from others. Only one company receives all payments directly from the customer in
cash. Three companies mentioned that they receive bank payment in addition to barter.
The two companies that have veksel agreements answered that they receive bank
payments and direct payments from their customers probably because this is the
arrangement that is used when the veksel is realized.
Commander and Mumssen (1998) give two main reasons for firms to avoid the banking
system. First, banks are notoriously ineffective and costly for its users. Transfers can
take months and delays are not compensated. Second, banks act as intermediaries for
                                               
37
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tax collection. By avoiding bank transfers the firm reduces both the visibility of
transactions and physical access to the companies’ assets.
Our figures for the Murmansk Oblast show that companies mainly use bank transfers
despite all the costs and disadvantages of keeping their money in a bank account. The
figure is quite different for the Republic of Karelia where only 17 percent solely use
bank transfers for payments. The reason here must be the high degree of barter that will
not be visible in the accounts.
How to sell without getting paid and still survive
The wood processing company “Arcticdrev” has been forced to make an offset or zachety
agreement with the timber supplier because it has no working capital to pay for supplies. The
reasons for the lack of working capital can be found at the output side. The main customer of
“Arcticdrev” is the non-ferrous combine “Severonikel” in Monchegorsk, which acquires 80
percent of “Arcticdrev’s” production. As part of the mining complex “Norilsk Nickel”,
“Severonikel” is used to settle trade agreements by non-monetary arrangements. After
privatization, the majority of the stocks belong to the Moscow bank “Oneximbank”.
“Severonikel” is in a difficult financial situation and does not pay “Arctivdrev” in cash. They
have made a veksel agreement for the transaction of forest products. A veksel is a Bill of
Exchange issued by banks and enterprises. Veksels are used as a means of payment. The
veksel can be used in exchange for other goods, or it can be sold for cash. We have reasons to
believe that the veksel is issued as a result of the “Oneximbank’s” ownership in
“Severonickel”. For “Arcticdrev” the veksel agreement means extra transaction costs and time
consuming arrangements for realizing the veksel. In any case, “Severonickel” is the most
important customer and getting some value back for the production is better than no money at
all.
Violation of Selling Agreement
The peculiarities of payment and lack of working capital among the customers cause a
lot of problems for the selling part. Fifty percent of the Murmansk companies in our
sample have big problems to collect payments and 25 percent consider violations as a
small problem. As the problems are reported by leskhozy and the harvesting and
processing companies, we can not find any corresponding pattern between the activity
of the enterprise and selling agreement violation. A more reasonable explanation can be
found if we take a look at the customer. Some customers are generally not very active in
the cash economy and the seller must accept their working conditions. Few selling firms
are in a position where they can choose among several customers and are stuck in an
unstable monetary business relationship. The figures are almost the same in Karelia,
while only 37.5 percent of the companies in the Arkhangelsk region have any problems.
Broken selling agreements anyway seem to be more frequent in the other Russian
regions in our sample, where 68.6 percent consider the violations to be a big problem.
In spite of these problems, companies seem to be patient with their “business partners”.
They accept some delays or negotiate to solve the problems. Almost everybody has
payment problems and the customer does not necessarily have to be an insolvent
company. They can have problems with delayed payment from their own customers.
This evil circle affects the whole economy and paralyzes monetary transactions.
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Diagram 6:7. Violation of selling agreements in selected regions.38
So what happens when selling agreements are broken? One third of the companies do
not have problems or do not consider the problems to be vital. Most of those who have
problems try to negotiate directly with the buyer. Late payments sometimes lead to
penalties like extra percentage added for the delayed payment. Some of the leskhozy
mention that companies that break contracts will be blacklisted from future leasing or
auction contracts.  They can always threaten with using arbitration courts, but this has
only been accomplished a few times in Murmansk, as the system of enforcing legal acts
is poor and the costs of pursuing a trial can be substantial. Small companies can not
afford to go to court. Two firms have reported using other types of sanctions. Four
companies seem to have resigned when it comes to violation of contracts problems.
They say that nothing will happen and they do not have any means to force the
customer.
Table 6:5. Enforcement of selling agreements.
Enforcement Frequency Percent
Negotiation 1 4.2
Sanctions, financial or other 2 8.3
Negotiation/arbitrage 5 20.8
Nothing happens 4 16.7
No problem 8 33.3
No answer/no sale 4 16.7
Total 24 100
                                               
38
 Companies with no answers have been excluded in the calculations.
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Enterprises’ Perceptions of Laws and Rules
We have asked the companies in our sample about the most important obstacles for their
business activities. The first question concerns “external” obstacles related to
legislation, enforcement of legislation and finding markets. Taxes are mentioned by
more than half of the companies as the most important obstacle. Everybody seems to
complain about taxes in Russia and taxes are just as difficult to handle for forest
companies as for others. The difficulty of collecting money forces the central authorities
to increase tax rates. Few are able to fulfil their tax duties in cash and find other non-
monetary arrangements.39 Surprisingly, half of the leskhozy in our sample also complain
about taxes, although they are exempted from paying tax on their sanitary cutting and
intermediary felling. The reason here must be that they must pay value added tax on
processed products (like other firms) and these activities are considerable for some of
the leskhozy. It is hardly surprising that the other half of the leskhozy find forest
legislation to be the most important obstacle since their possibility to earn money was
reduced by taking away their possibility of industrial cutting and, at the same time,
reduced the federal funding. Only a few companies mention business legislation, the
enforcement of business legislation and problems with finding markets and competition
as the most important obstacles for their activities.
Table 6.6. Most important external obstacles for activities of the enterprises.
External obstacles Frequency
Taxes 13
Forest legislation 3
Business legislation 1
Enforcement of business legislation 1
Find market/competition 2
Other 2
No answer 2
An important question is if the perceived obstacles for business are unique for the
region or common for companies in all parts of Russia. Almost all the rules and laws
that the companies have complained about are federal and should be equal for all. They
can anyway affect the companies differently or to different degrees. The comparison
between the regions in our study shows that most companies in all regions perceive
taxes as the main problem, but Murmansk is the region where most companies are
complaining about taxes. The other groups of obstacles do not indicate big differences
between regions and appear as general problems.
                                               
39
 According to Gaddy and Ickes (1998) about 40 percent of federal taxes were collected in cash in 1997,
29 percent were paid in non-monetary form and 31 percent were never paid.
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Diagram 6:8. Most important obstacles for business in the Russian North.
The second question related to obstacles focuses on internal problems for developing
the business activity. All the categories of obstacles seem to be important for most of
the firms and they have marked more alternatives. Old machinery and technology is
most important, mentioned by 20 of the companies. Almost all are suffering from
outdated or incomplete machinery. Seventeen companies mention the lack of
equipment, problems of obtaining spare parts and maintenance of facilities. Skills
among the employees are also an obstacle, but not a serious obstacle in the 9 companies
that answered affirmatively on this question. The respondents mention problems in
finding specialists and this is not surprising as many specialists where forced to leave
when the staff was reduced. Many have also left by their own will as they can get better
paid in other branches. It is hard to recruit new staff, as there are no educational
institutions in the region for educating forest specialists (see chapter 3). Specialists are
no longer “transferred” from educational institutions to the regions and salaries are not
sufficiently high to attract experts to the cold north.
Table 6:7. Most important internal obstacles for business activities.
Obstacle Frequency
Machinery/technology 20
Equipment/maintenance 17
Skills/competence 9
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Most Binding Restriction for the Operation of the Region’s Forest
Companies
Another related issue in our questionnaire is where companies are asked to mention the
most binding restriction for their activity. Again, it is very clear that the financial
problems and lack of working capital are the most important restriction mentioned by
37.5 percent of the companies. Second, they refer to technology (16.7%) and problems
in finding markets (12.5%).
Table 6:8. Most important binding restriction for operation of firms.
Binding restriction Frequency Percentage
Economy/transition 3 12.5
Tax legislation/burden 1 4.2
Transport cost 2 8,3
Technology 4 16.7
Financial/no capital 9 37.5
Find market 3 12.5
No privilege/state support 1 4.2
Other 1 4.2
Total 24 100
Changes of Rules and Laws
The companies were asked if they found the formal legislation adequate for their
business; 62 percent of the Murmansk forest companies negatively answered this
question.  The design of laws seems to be the biggest problem: laws are contradictory.
They do not cover everything and legislation is rapidly changing. Laws and rules appear
not to be transparent enough for stable business conditions. Second in importance is the
problem of enforcing the laws. The authorities do not always follow up legal acts and
exceptions to rules can be allowed by unofficial means.
What then must be changed in the Russian forest sector? This was an open question to
the companies. Some answers are general as changes in the tax system, lower taxes,
fewer taxes and tax exemption (5 respondents). Changes in forest legislation were
mentioned by seven companies and in general without any specification. The rest of the
answers fall into one of two categories: those who want to revert to the old system of
central control and those who want more market economy. In the first category, we
found 6 companies that want the central authorities to coordinate and control the forest
sector. According to the respondents, this would create more stable conditions for the
enterprises as their role would be better defined and they would know who should sell
to whom. Three companies share the opinion that forest enterprises need some
economic privileges. Two aspire for some regional economic benefits, as their
conditions in the north are more difficult and costly. One wants some economic support
for the producing sector. The old tradition of economic subsidies to the sector does not
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favor the development of market conditions. Reintroducing these features must be seen
as a step backwards. The other category is more in favor of changing development
towards a functioning market system. Five companies argue for privatization of the
State Forest Fund. The market would then regulate the price and accessibility and they
would not be dependent on the leskhozy for harvesting timber. There are also two
companies that explicitly mention the need for developing a market economy for the
sector. The central regulations prevent the natural market mechanisms to develop. The
central programs are doomed to fail as the state has lost control. Some single companies
mentioned a few more changes that would support the development of a market
economy.
Table 6:9. Important changes required in the Russian forest sector according to the
survey enterprises in Murmansk Oblast (N=21).*
Changes Frequency
General changes Forest legislation 7
Taxes 5
Back to old system Central control and coordination 6
Regional/branch privileges 3
Towards a market system Private property of forest fund 5
Independence from the center 1
Help from west 1
Change harvesting methods 1
More market economy 2
SUM 31
* There are more answers than companies since some enterprises mentioned several necessary
changes.
Summary
• Most companies have not changed their main production line during the transition
period but the number of products has decreased and some have completely
disappeared. A few companies have adapted to the new market conditions for
individual designed products for the new rich Russians.
• The Murmansk forest companies are small in size with a limited number of
employees.
• More than 40 percent of the companies still contribute something to the social
provisions in their communities, but the contributions are rather small and irregular.
Seventeen percent provide employees with housing.
• Forty-five percent of the companies make investments in the company, mainly
funded with their own money, as bank loans are not accessible.
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• Sixty-five percent of the companies report a shortage in timber supply, though many
get their main supply from one provider. Lack of money to buy the needed timber is
the main reason for the shortage.
• Leasing contracts predominate over auction contracts for timber acquisition among
the companies. Almost all use written contracts and receive their payments through
the bank.
• Violation of buying agreements is a big problem for 38 percent of the companies.
This figure is higher than in the other northern regions but much lower than for the
rest of Russia.
• For 87 percent of the companies the main market is still in Murmansk Oblast.
However, 50 percent have some kind of export activity and processed products
dominate the output.
• Payment for sold products is usually arranged with cash on or before delivery.
Twenty-five percent of the companies use non-monetary payments, as veksels and
barter.
• Fifty-five percent of the companies have big problems with the violation of selling
agreements but they are usually patient with the customer and work out a solution.
Some have brought the partner before the arbitration court but small firms can not
afford this and it might not solve their problems anyway.
• Current rules and laws represent “external obstacles” for the activities of the forest
companies. Taxes dominate on the list of obstacles. “Internal” obstacles for the
activity are old machinery and equipment.
• The most binding restriction is lack of capital.
• Over 60 percent of the companies are not satisfied with current legislation. Forest
regulations and the tax system should be changed.
• The companies can be divided into two groups: those who want more central control
and coordination and those who want more market economy in the sector with
private property of the forest fund.
7. Evaluation Criteria and Conclusions
In this last chapter we try to sum up the findings from our study of the forest sector in
Murmansk Oblast by using some evaluation criteria presented in Chapter 1. The
findings will be related to the IAD-framework and the possible future of the industry
will be elaborated.
Evaluation Criteria
We will go through the evaluation criteria that were listed in the introductory chapter.
The same criteria is used in all of the regional reports undertaken in IIASA’s
Institutional Framework study in order to be able to identify regional differences. They
will allow us to make some conclusions about the extent to which the forest companies
are restructuring towards a market economy and the extent to which the institutional
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framework in which they are embedded really has changed and become more open and
democratic. The problems with answering these questions are manifold: first, it is by
necessity highly speculative to say something general about a diversified society and
companies that are developing in different directions. Second, we are not sure about the
goal of the restructuring process, neither at the company level nor at the macro level.
The political instability and continuous changes of leadership make the future uncertain
and often prevent companies to take the necessary steps.
Are Constitutional rules acknowledged and transparent?
The legal framework in Russia has gone through tremendous changes during the last
few years. Everything needed to be changed fast and the adoption of the most important
laws was blocked in the Duma because of an unfavorable composition of the parliament
with no political force in majority. The final version of the law text was therefore often
not perfect, but the best one could expect after numerous revisions and making
compromises with different political blocks.
The main problem is inconsistency and lack of coordination between the laws. What
might be legal according to one law might be criminal according to another. For
instance, the Forest Code is in contradiction with the Constitution when it comes to
property rights and in contradiction with the Environmental Protection Law when it
comes to protection of species.
Continuity is another problem. An adopted law can easily be amended or abolished by
Presidential decrees and this can rapidly change the daily life of companies. In
particular small companies have problems in keeping abreast of the continuous changes
in legislation and need expertise in laws and bookkeeping in order to be able to meet
requirements. The tax law causes huge problems both because the tax rate is too high
and because the loopholes in the texts are numerous and “must” be utilized.
When it comes to transparency, there are unfortunately some decrees and agreements
(usually between the President and different regions) that are secret and not known to
the public. Some of these agreements deal with natural resources, like oil and gas, but
we have no information of any secret agreements concerning forestry.
Is the structure of property rights settled and well defined, i.e., can private actors
acquire property or get the right to utilize property for their own benefit?
The Forest Code has not made the property rights to forest resources completely clear.
All the forests still belong to the federal state and the role of the region is ambiguous.
This has become a problem for those regions that have developed their own Forest
Codes. Murmansk Oblast never had its own code and never developed a regional
interest in the forest property debate, so this has not been an issue. The rules for
acquiring timber should be clear for the companies, though formal leasing and auction
agreements are sometimes avoided by direct negotiations with the leskhoz. This can
generally be seen as a negative feature that reduces transparency of agreements and
hinders competition. But, in the case of Murmansk there is no real competition and
direct negotiations are used to simplify the procedures.
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When it comes to the property rights of forest company estates, it can be questioned
whether the privatization process actually gave private actors a possibility to acquire
property. Our investigation shows that about half of the privatized forest enterprises
were formed as closed joint stock companies. This means that only the employees could
access the shares and become owners. In practice, the leadership obtained the majority
of the stocks and the workers had little influence. The open joint stock companies were
exposed to bids from outside investors, though there were few outsiders who had
enough money and interest in making investments. It is not sure that a more open
company form would have attracted more outside shareholders. Since most of the
companies in the Murmansk sample are genuinely new (i.e., not old, privatized state
companies) the ownership has developed according to the founders’ contribution of
capital.
Are rules and regulations from official authorities regarded as legitimate and do they
apply equally to similar actors?
One can hardly say that rules are legitimate since most companies complain about and
try to avoid them. The business sphere is definitely over-regulated with laws, rules and
resolutions. The tax rules are an example, where cheating and utilizing the loopholes are
necessary for survival. It is hard to trust the authorities when they accept illegal
solutions themselves. Rules are often not equal to identical actors. Again, taxes are an
example of negotiations between companies and the authorities. Non-monetary
payments are often accepted and exemptions can be discussed. Good contacts and
personal relations with the authorities can be a more important part of business life than
running a profitable company.
Does the market decide the prices of property and goods?
The market price for a standing forest is often claimed to be too high by the harvesting
companies but, in fact, prices are rather low compared to western markets. The
stumpage fee, below which prices are not allowed to decrease, is not reflecting the
market price and is often used in Murmansk Oblast where there is little competition.
Only in the southern part of the region are prices sometimes slightly above stumpage.
The privatization of the state owned forest companies were not carried out in a way that
can be said to reflect the market value of the enterprises. Most were given to the
employees for a symbolic price, as a result of bargaining between the authorities and the
company leadership. It is difficult to know if there would have been many others
interested in buying the facility, as it was in most cases old and of limited value.
However, it enabled the old leadership to start anew and get rid of debts. In general,
there were few that had enough money to invest in an enterprise as the privatization
process went hastily and at a time when savings were minimal.
Prices of forest products are now to some extent set by the market. This is especially
true for the export price. The low demand on the domestic market forces companies to
sell at prices that can be less than the production costs. The problems of getting cash
payments and the extra transaction costs involved with the barter economy also
contradict the market forces in price setting. Goods are assigned an artificially high
price and can be paid for with other goods that are difficult to sell.
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Is decision-making regarding collective choice and operational rules decentralized?
The management of forests has been decentralized to the Murmansk Forest Manage-
ment and decisions can now be made closer to the users of the forests. However, as
federal financial support has decreased substantially, this is a decentralization that has
transferred much of the economic responsibility to a lower administrative level.
On the company level, privatization has definitely lead to a decentralization of decision
making. Since there is no regional union or holding company in Murmansk (as in most
other regions), companies have been left alone without too much interference. The
absence of a forest lobby has also left all decisions with the individual firm. A few state
owned companies owned by the State Property Fund or municipal authorities are an
exception.
Can private investors realize the returns on their investments?
The possibility of a shareholder to realize the return on his investment is dependent
upon the legal status of the company and connected to his initial instalment. The
workers seldom own many shares. The majority of the shares usually belong to the
managers or outside investors. We have reasons to believe that few shareholders can
take out any profits at this stage, as most of the enterprises are unprofitable and have
huge debts. It will definitely be a better strategy to invest the profit in the company.
Asset stripping is however, a well-known method of extracting the valuables when
companies are declared bankrupt. This also happened in Murmansk after privatization
of the forest enterprises but that is, of course, not an appropriate way of realizing
returns.
Are rules enacted aimed at preventing the devastation of natural resources?
Some of the critics of the Forest Code indicate that it contradicts other laws, such as the
Law on Nature Protection. The major focus on harvesting can affect biodiversity and
protection of rare species.
The economic difficulties of the leskhozy are also something that will have a long-term
effect on the sustainability of the forests. Leskhozy do not have enough money to do the
necessary replantation after clear cutting, fighting diseases, and performing the required
fire prevention.
Do legitimate authorities take measures against violation of rules?
Violation of rules are frequent when there is no respect for the rules, no trust in the
authorities that are supposed to maintain them and no enforcement that can prevent
repeated disobedience. Russian forestry lacks these driving forces in the same way as
the management lacks economic resources. Violation of rules is often profitable as the
possibility of being caught is low, punishment is no deterrent, and one can usually bribe
one’s way out of a situation.
Violation of business agreements is also common and can only be brought to the
arbitration court if the company can afford lawyers’ expenses. Small companies usually
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can not afford this and the enterprises must take the burden themselves.  A legal court
decision is by no means a sufficient prerequisite for payment, as the business partner
often is insolvent and is declared bankrupt. Informal sanction methods (like using the
“mafia”) can often be more effective. Many conflicts also arise between companies and
authorities as in the case of tax disputes. The arbitration court has developed in a
positive way facilitating business, but again there is still a long way to go to accomplish
trust in legal authorities.
Conclusion
This section tries to sum up the findings of the report according to the institutional
analysis and development framework (IAD) outlined in the introductory chapter and
some important concepts of sector studies in a transition economy.
Our study of the forest sector in Murmansk Oblast focuses on a region that differs from
other Russian forest regions as it has only limited forest resources. The climatic
conditions and low productivity in the north has limited the extent of forestry and
industrial activities leading to a sector with few and small units. However, the “rules in
use” in Murmansk are not so different from other Russian regions studied in IIASA’s
institutional analysis study. Federal laws and the Forest Code set the standard for all
forest activity, but through priorities expressed in programs, funds and regional laws the
regions themselves can influence the working condition for forestry and forest industry.
Murmansk Oblast is a region without a clear priority for its forest sector activities as
there is no forest lobby in the regional administration and no programs to attract
domestic or foreign investments.
One peculiarity of the forest sector in Murmansk Oblast is that wood harvesting and a
limited industry based on processed products were developed and run with heavy state
subsidies. No doubt this dependency has affected the ability of the privatized companies
to manage on their own. A pulp and paper industry was never developed in the region.
The settlements of the Kola Peninsula were built on the development of natural
resources like minerals and fish, but the forest sector was never of any importance for
employment or industrial output produced in the region. The socioeconomic condition
of the region is not particularly positive as people are moving to the south and the forest
sector is losing specialists for better paid jobs in other sectors or regions.
As in other regions, all forest management units (leskhozy) have experienced a lack of
state funding and are not allowed to make money from their own industrial harvesting.
This has hit forestry in the region particularly hard since several leskhozy have no (or
only a very small) demand for forest plots or forest products. The numbers of plots sold
through auctions and leasing are limited and there is no real market with competition on
prices of forests.
With this rather depressive history, the Murmansk forest industry was hit by a more or
less forced privatization during the transition period at the beginning of the 1990s. Most
companies in the Murmansk Oblast were not prepared for restructuring as they lacked
money for investments, equipment and machinery and management skills. The action
arena changed completely as old customers disappeared and new relations had to be
developed. New forms of timber acquisition were launched and market prices were
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introduced not only on the wood and forest products, but also on transport, electricity,
fuel and other important expenditures for the sector.
The outcome of the transition was an extensive drop in wood harvesting from one
million m3 at the beginning of the 1990s to less than 100,000 m3 in 1998. This drop is
relatively larger than in the other Russian regions in the IIASA study. But when we take
into account the minor size and importance of the sector prior to transition, we must say
that the effect of the drop was much smaller here than in the intensive Russian forest
regions. A limited number of people and families in the villages were affected but the
consequences for them were, of course, serious.
An interesting question is whether any other outcome of the transition process of the
forest sector in Murmansk Oblast could realistically be expected. We believe that the
forest sector in Murmansk Oblast lacks important preconditions for a successful change.
• Privatization without restructuring
First of all, the privatization of forest companies was carried out in a way that often
prevented real restructuring. Most managers in the state companies continued in the
privatized enterprise without adapting to the new market. They made no restructuring of
the production process, economic dispositions and management. A privatization process
without real restructuring can not succeed and our interviews with company representa-
tives have confirmed their unwillingness to restructure. Nearly half of the companies
wish to revert to some kind of centrally planned and subsidized forest sector. With this
attitude one can hardly expect vital changes.
• Privatization without investments
Privatization also requires investments. But since most companies were given to the
employees more or less for free, little fresh money was brought into the ventures. Few
outside investors were interested in the sector and the bank crisis made funds
inaccessible for the owners. The fact that many companies had to sell their equipment
when they became bankrupt does not help to make a new start as a privatized company.
• Market economy without demand
In a market economy, prices for the forest products must be set according to the pro-
duction costs but at the same time reflect what the market is willing to pay. In
Murmansk, there were few who wanted or could pay. The construction firms, mining
and fishing industries no longer demanded any forest products, as their own production
had been drastically reduced. Some forest companies continued to produce for storage,
hoping for better times, while others limited production to a minimum.
• Market economy without payments
Forest companies are kept in an evil circle where both sellers and buyers have huge
debts. This seldom brings real money into business operations and makes the trans-
action costs high. Barter and non-monetary arrangements are a way of solving short-
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term payment problems and keep the company operating, but it is not a constructive
solution for developing a market economy.
• Development of a forest sector without priority
The forest sector of Murmansk Oblast has suffered from a lack of priority in the
regions’ budgets and political programs. This is a problem for both private companies
and the management units, the leskhozy. The forest management is dependent upon
funding and the income to the regional (oblast) administration from the stumpage fee
shall, according to the law, be transferred back to regenerating the forest. Our material
demonstrates that such a transfer does not exist.
Does Murmansk Oblast Need a Forest Industry in the Future?
An unpleasant, but appropriate, question that should be asked is whether the Murmansk
region really needs a forest industry. With a minimal demand of forest products, harsh
climate and growing conditions, small and unprofitable production units, and lack of
skilled workers, perhaps it would be better to buy the needed products from neighboring
regions or from abroad. It might even be cheaper.
The main question here is if there really will be a demand for the forest sector output
produced in the region in the future. Can the companies count on a regional/domestic
market for their products? It is obvious that the economic crisis has affected the demand
for all kinds of products and we can only speculate about the future situation. There are
definitely private persons and companies who need and want to buy forest products, but
lack of financial resources hinder them in realizing the demand. To change this
deadlock requires tremendous amendments of the whole Russian economy and policies.
Changes that will make it easier for the companies to operate in a normal market with
free prices, supply and demand.
First, let us take a look at the expected demand for firewood. This product is mostly
required by the local population and is used for heating private houses. Houses with a
stove for firewood are mainly located in countryside villages that are dependent upon
wood as an energy source to keep warm during the arctic winters. The village
population is limited (7.7%) and urban residents do not use firewood as they are
connected to central heating. The exception can be those who have a country house, a
datcha. Russians have a tradition of cutting timber in the forest themselves and not buy
it from the leskhozy or sawmills that are the legal sellers. This tradition will barely
change as the economic problems have hit the villagers intensely and money must be
saved for other expenditures. There will hardly be an increasing demand for firewood in
the region as long as the moral is low and the chances of being caught are small (due to
the limited resources of the leskhozy).
The sawmills will demand timber as long as they can get customers for their production
of sawn wood. The main customers for forest products have traditionally been building
and construction firms and the mining and metallurgy industry. The construction
activity has drastically declined during the transition period and the branch hardly has
any large orders. We can also see that the regional administration and banks are using
foreign companies to build schools, hospitals, and administrative buildings. These
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companies probably bring most of the materials from abroad. Building private houses
seldom occurs in the region but this can, of course, change if the middle class develops
and more people reach a higher living standard. There is a demand for lumber for
rebuilding apartments and cottages but this can hardly become a big market.
The mining and metallurgy industry has also reduced the demand for timber and lumber
as their production and profitability has decreased. The mining companies mainly use
timber and lumber to secure the mine corridors, for related buildings and so forth. The
metallurgy industry uses wood in the technological process and needs pallets for
transportation of the final product. When, and if, these industries’ production reaches
their former level, the demand for wood products will rise again.
The demand for processed products has also declined. Windows and doors are to a
limited extent required by construction firms. Private companies and individuals no
longer want to buy mass-produced, bad quality products, and demand individually
adapted products. The old companies that used to produce windows, doors and furniture
have died and new ones have emerged. Some of them have adapted to the new market
and have good possibilities to expand when purchasing power increases. Customers are
mainly private persons and private companies. There is definitely an accumulated need
for the modernization of flats, offices, and public institutions, and the demand might
perhaps be larger than one can expect today.
The fish processing industry in the region has used different kinds of packages for their
products, like cardboard boxes and pallets for transportation. As far as we know, there
are no producers of cardboard left in the region. The fish processing industry in the
region has almost been closed down as most of the fish is delivered to Norwegian and
other foreign ports. The regional administration has taken some steps, however, to
maintain some deliveries to Murmansk. But the branch will not demand a large amount
of processed wooden products as long as there is limited industrial activity.
The above analysis suggests that the revitalization of the regional industry should be
seen as the main factor for expanding the domestic demand for forest products. Some
companies do not believe that this will happen and have therefore tried another survival
strategy.
Can the Forest Industry Survive?
The question for most of the companies is how to survive until the domestic market
recovers. We have found two main strategies: a survival strategy that is a “wait and see”
attitude. The companies in this group have not made any changes in their production or
management, they produce more or less for storage, accumulate debts and are not taking
any initiative of finding new markets or customers. The future for these companies is
very uncertain, and they can not, we believe, survive. Nobody will come and rescue
them, subsidize their production or find new customers for them.
The second strategy is to restructure and develop the industry for the export market.
New management, development of new market strategies and contacts, adapting the
production to new standards of quality and efficiency, follow this strategy. There are 4–
5 companies in our sample that can be placed in this group, and they have already taken
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the necessary steps. They have used the income from exports to invest in new
machinery and technology, which has made them more competitive on the market. This
will enable them to meet the domestic market with many advantages if and when it
recovers. We should not forget that there is a new domestic market that is emerging
based on the private demand by the new developing Russian middle-class. Only
restructured companies can meet this demand as the new middle-class claims quality at
the same level as the foreign market.
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